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Executive Summery 
 
 
International Migration Dynamics 
 
• In 2009, 2.9% of the global population, or approximately 190 million people, 
were migrants, with foreign-born people making up around 12% of the total 
population in OECD countries.  Migration rates to OECD countries have 
tripled since the 1960s and are likely to continue to increase overall, despite 
a slight decline in numbers in the past couple of years. 
• Migrating for family reasons is the most prominent explanation for 
immigration.  Around 70% of immigration in the United States and 60% of 
immigration in France is family-related. Labour migration also constitutes an 
important explanation for movement. 30-40% of the permanent migrants 
settling in Italy, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom arrived for labour 
related reasons.  The world has also witnessed a significant increase in the 
number of asylum seekers in recent decades, though the numbers have 
recently dropped. 
• Immigration to Europe in particular has been on the rise.  In 2006, according 
to Eurostat, the largest immigrant groups entering EU27 countries were from 
Poland (290,000), Romania (230,000), Morocco (140,000), the United 
Kingdom, Ukraine and China (each with approximately 100,000), and 
Germany (90,000). 
• The countries that in turn received the most immigrants were Spain 
(803,000), Germany (558,500) and the UK (451,700). Together, these three 
countries received 60% of all of the immigrants in the EU27. When the size 
of the host population is considered, however, it was Luxembourg that 
accepted the most immigrants (28.8 foreign immigrants per 1000 
inhabitants), as well as Ireland (19.6), Cyprus (18.7), Spain (18.1) and 
Austria (10.3). The average for the entire European Union was 6.2 foreign 
immigrants per 1000 inhabitants. 
• For the past decade, net migration has been the most significant cause for 
population change in the European Union. In 2007, the population of the 
EU27 grew by 2.4 million people.  This growth consisted of net migration of 
1.9 million people and with a natural population increase of 0.5 million 
people.  
 
 
Spain as a destination country of international migration  
 
• When compared with immigration dynamics in other European countries 
over the past decade, Spain has clearly experienced quite extraordinary 
trends.  Spain is noteworthy for being one of the countries with the largest 
influx of foreigners during the 2000-2007 period in proportion to its size: in 
the Spanish case, an increase representing 12% of its population in just 7 
years. By early 2009, the number of foreigners residing in Spain had 
surpassed 5.5 million. Although Spain represents only 9% of the population 
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of the 27 countries of the EU, it has been responsible for over 35% of overall 
EU population growth in the last decade.   
• Undocumented immigrants are estimated to make up 20% of foreign 
population in Spain.  This situation ultimately compromises an immigration 
policy meant to regulate immigration flow. 
• The most common type of immigrant in Spain is a young (32-33 years old) 
man or woman (50% of each sex) coming typically from Romania, Morocco, 
Ecuador and Colombia (this 4 countries make up 60% of total economic 
immigrants) who is willing to enter immediately into the Spanish labour 
market. 
• Two main factors explain the influx of immigrants to Spain: a period of 
strong economic growth in sectors dependent on intensive manual and low-
skilled labour, and the relative scarcity of population in the potentially active 
age group due to an aging population. 
• Spanish real GDP growth between 2001 and 2008 was 3.5%, the second 
largest in the EU12. In this period 4.7 million new jobs were created in the 
country (31% of all EU employment). The slight increase in the potential 
workforce, in the activity rate and in the employment rate among the native 
population only accounts for two million out of this 4.7 million jobs; the rest 
were filled by immigrants.  
 
 
Historical review and evaluation of Spanish immigration policy  
 
• The legal requirements for foreign workers are similar to those of the 
majority of all EU states: authorization to live in the country is granted 
primarily on the grounds of obtaining permission to work, with the duration 
of the residence permission being linked to the duration of the employment. 
• According to the evolution of the Spanish immigration policy, three 
distinctive stages can be highlighted. The first involved the establishment of 
a legal basis for entry and stay, the second established the presumption that 
immigration would be lasting, and therefore saw the introduction of social 
integration and family reunification policies, and the third is characterised by 
the reinforcement of security related measures. 
• Since the year 2000, immigration issues have been a particular bone of 
contention among the main political parties represented in Parliament (PSOE 
and PP).  This conservative – liberal political polarization has posed an 
obstacle for a coherent immigration policy, as it has been partly responsible 
for frequent changes of immigration laws and procedures.  
• One of the main distinctive characteristics of Spanish immigration policy 
history has been the regular use of mass regularisation programmes since the 
mid 1980s. The possible consequences of these massive regularizations are 
not clear and the opinion swings from those who think that regularization 
processes may have intensified attempts of illegal entry into Spain, to those 
that deny this “knock-on effect” and judge such regularisation measures as 
inadequate but necessary for solving the problem of irregular migration.  
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• Overall, the historical design and application of Spanish immigration policy 
can be criticised.  The promotion of immigration through the legally 
established channels of entry and stay has remained unsatisfactory and the 
rigidity of the work permit system has meant that labour demand could not 
be satisfied with documented immigrants. 
• The current economic crisis has led to an over-supply of workers which in 
turn has promoted the adoption of more restrictive measures for the 
admission of new immigrants. 
 
 
Economic integration and contribution 
 
• The activity rate (rate of those who are actively seeking employment) is 
substantially higher among immigrants (77%) than natives (58%) but the 
employment rate is substantially higher for natives both before and after the 
current economic crisis (90% versus 83% pre-recession and 84% versus 72% 
pre-recession). 
• The total number of employed immigrants was nearly 3 million before the 
current economic downturn, which represents about 15% of the total Spanish 
workforce (14% during current recession levels). 
• The Spanish job market has a very clear gender segmentation which is even 
more pronounced with respect to immigrants: about 90% of immigrant 
women work in the service sector; male immigrants were employed, before 
the recession, in the building industry (40%) and the service sector (40%)  
• Around 35% of immigrants are working without a contract (62% in rural 
areas).  While reliable figures are difficult to find, reasonable estimates 
suggest that the number of undocumented workers is about one million, 
which has given rise to a de facto labour market duality. 
• The direct contribution to the total Spanish GDP from immigrant labour is 
about 9.7%. Adding “economic chain reaction effects”, the total economic 
impact, with respect to the private sector, has been estimated to be 13.2% of 
GDP. 
• The employment of immigrants (both regular and irregular), estimated at 
2,444,000 workers can be directly linked to the jobs of 1,624,000 natives, 
which means that for approximately every three jobs held by immigrants one 
additional job held by a native worker has been created. 
 
 
Social integration of immigrants 
 
• According to the MIPEX index, Spain ranked tenth (out of 25 countries) in 
terms of immigrant integration policies, showing its best performance in the 
area of access to job markets (second) and its weakest in political 
participation, access to citizenship, and anti-discrimination (ranked 17th in 
this last category). 
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• The different approaches taken on immigrant integration issues from the 
perspective of different integration plans (national, regional or local) limit 
the effectiveness of immigrant integration policy.   
• An important policy trend is to foster the development of specific integration 
programs for new immigrants by means of integration policies focused 
heavily on actions aimed at improving access to local resources and shelter 
(short-term focus on integration) but more attention needs to be paid to the 
adoption of medium and long-term integration measures.  
• Existing integration measures insufficiently treat integration as a “two-way” 
process which requires the adaptation of both migrants and the host society. 
 
 
Challenges and opportunities for Spanish immigration policy 
 
• With the new circumstances brought on by the recession, the ground rules 
are likely to change dramatically over the coming years. In the medium and 
long term, one key way to achieve adequate growth in job demand is by 
investing technology-oriented companies, thus preventing the off-shoring of 
production due to lower labour costs. 
• The Spanish labour market can be expected to witness further job losses 
through the year (2010). In the medium term, growth can be expected to be 
stronger in sectors that, on one hand, are generally consumptive and offer 
fewer jobs, and, on the other, that require a more highly skilled workforce.  
• In this new context, the benefits that have attracted a large influx of 
immigrants will decline considerably, and, presumably, so too will the 
numbers of those seeking to immigrate.  Studies confirm that being 
unemployed can indeed be a factor that would increase an immigrant’s 
likelihood to return but that other variables will also have to be considered. 
• Taking into account the forecast for migration flows and the future period of 
economic recovery, as well as considering the trend of immigration policies 
of other Member States, Spanish immigration policy is likely to become 
more restrictive. In particular, the number of family reunifications can be 
expected to become a more contentious issue. 
• Nevertheless, we can expect a continued influx of new third country 
nationals and also a sustained inflow due to family reunifications.  In 
addition, given the growth of the young population in many third countries, 
the economic and social differences as well as the political instability, it is 
unlikely that migratory pressure will fall dramatically in the near future even 
taking into account that the current economic crisis is expected to reduce the 
number of new entries. 
• The reinforcement and formalising of dialogue with immigrant organizations 
and other organizations which deal with migration issues, including Trade 
Union and Employer Organizations, could help the development of effective 
migration and migrant integration policies.   
• With regard to irregular migration policies, it the regular use of mass 
regularization programmes should be re-considered.   
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• It is further necessary to design and implement more effective migrant 
integration programme in order to achieve the sustainable integration of 
people already settled in Spain as well as those who will arrive in the near 
future.  There is a growing need to articulate more clearly the benefits of 
diversity and to pursue policies that promote social cohesion. 
 
 
The Effectiveness of Immigration Laws: How Much Does Policy Matter? 
 
• A key analytical challenge for academics and policy makers is the 
relationship between migration flows, policies and the impact of 
immigration.  Crucially, one would need to be able to assess the capacity of 
policy measures to influence migration outcomes, i.e. to what extent 
variation in migratory flows are due to differences in policy. In order to find 
answers to such questions, we need comparative datasets of policy measures.   
• Such datasets currently exist in only few areas of migration policy.  Where 
they do exist, such as in the field of asylum policy, they allow for studies that 
can provide unprecedented insights into the effectiveness of policy measures. 
• In the case of asylum policy, highlighted here, is has been shown that the 
most prominent public policy measures aimed at regulating asylum flows are 
often less effective than sometimes assumed. The most powerful explanatory 
factors for migrants’ (and asylum seekers’) choice of host country are only 
partly due to differences in policy, but more importantly due to legacies of 
migrant networks and relative employment opportunities in host countries.  
This means that asylum destination choice is affected above all by 
‘structural’ factors that, at least in the short and medium term, are beyond the 
reach of asylum policy makers.    
• It can be shown that the most effective policy instruments to regulate asylum 
flows are determination policies and policies that regulate labour market 
access for asylum seekers.  Many other prominent policy measures such as 
safe third country provisions, dispersal and voucher schemes for asylum 
seekers can be shown to have little or no effect on the distribution of asylum 
flows in Europe.  
• The results of research that uses comparative and disaggregated policy data 
as highlighted in this report, opens up the prospect of a highly promising 
future agenda for migration research that is likely to provide important new 
insights for academics and policy makers alike. 
 
 
Looking Ahead: A Future Agenda for Immigration Policy Research 
 
• As comparative datasets for disaggregated policy data are currently very 
rare, it should be a priority for future research in this field to compile such 
datasets as they can be expected to give researchers and policy-makers new 
insights on how to best manage and regulate immigration.   
• This report provides an important stepping stone for this wider research 
ambition.  By taking stock of our existing knowledge and its current 
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boundaries, highlighted with the case of Spain, a country that has undergone 
a unique transformation in migration flows and policies, this report has 
directly fed into this future comparative migration research agenda.   
• The International Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) Project, a 
collaborative research undertaking initiated by the LSE Migration Studies 
Unit, Harvard University, the University of Sydney, the University of 
Amsterdam and the University of Luxembourg, aims to devise a system for 
measuring and evaluating the operation of national immigration laws, 
policies and practices against contextualised statistical data and outcomes.  
The project aims to devise a common standard or coding system that will 
facilitate the evaluation and comparison of immigration law and policy both 
across nations and through time within individual states.   
• By creating a comprehensive, cross-nationally comparable dataset on 
immigration laws, policies and practices - contextualised by the parallel 
collection of statistical and other outcomes - the project will enable scholars 
and policy makers to evaluate the effects of different approaches to 
managing immigration, which is hoped to make a critical contribution to 
ongoing debates and policy decisions.  
• The envisaged IMPALA dataset should be of great value not only to policy 
makers but also to researchers in a wide variety of academic disciplines. It 
will be useful to economists interested in explaining immigration flows and 
their economic effects, to sociologists examining the social and cultural 
consequences of immigration, to political scientists interested in explaining 
immigration policies and the political impact of immigration, and to legal 
scholars studying the rights granted to immigrants and refugees in different 
countries. 
• This report, like the envisaged IMPALA dataset, by providing a precise and 
comprehensive survey of immigration flows, policies and the wider impact 
of immigration, is hoped to help researchers and policy-makers to assess the 
effectiveness of immigration policy measures more accurately.  Hopefully 
this will inform future migration policies that will maximise the benefits of 
international migration for migrants and destination countries alike. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Immigration dynamics have varied across time and across countries and 
immigration flows can have a significant economic, social, political and cultural impact 
on host countries.  The challenge for policy makers and academics is to better 
understand to what extent public policy decisions can influence migration flows and 
their impact.  To address this research challenge, we need to advance a broader 
comparative research agenda that allows for a systematic comparison of immigration 
policy outputs (laws) and immigration policy outcomes (the impact of such laws).   
 
This report seeks to contribute to such a research agenda and the development of 
a corresponding methodological framework that would allow for such an empirical 
investigation.  This report will first provide a historical overview of European migration 
trends that will set the Spanish experience in its broader context.  The next part focuses 
on the evolution of Spanish immigration policy and its impact, and also provides an 
analytical summary of recent research contributions in this area.  The final part 
identifies the limitations of existing research designs and proposes a broader 
comparative research agenda that would help the academic and policy-making 
community deepen their understanding of the variation and differential impact of 
immigration policies.   
 
 
 
2. International Migration Dynamics 
2.1 Global Trends 
Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in the global migrant 
population. In 1970, 2.2% of the global population were migrants, yet as of 2009, 2.9% 
of the global population, or approximately 190 million people, were migrants. 
Migration rates to OECD countries have tripled since the 1960s and are likely to 
continue to increase overall, despite a slight decline in numbers in the past couple of 
years (Keeley, 2009, 12). 
 
While immigration was primarily economically driven in the past, and arguably 
still is, recent years have witnessed a variety of other factors come to play a greater role 
in influencing peoples’ decisions to move. Migrating for family reasons is the most 
prominent explanation for immigration, as around 70% of immigration in the United 
States and 60% of immigration in France is family-related. Labour migration also 
constitutes an important explanation for movement as 30-40% of the permanent 
migrants settling in Italy, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom arrived for labour 
related reasons (SOPEMI, 2008, 22). Immigrants also generally play a very important 
role in the work force in many OECD countries, with immigrants filling over 1/3 of 
low-skilled jobs in the United States (Keeley, 2009, 12). 
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Figure 1. Permanent-type Immigration by Category of Inflow, 2006 
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Source: SOPEMI, 2008, 36 (*equivalent Spanish data unavailable from SOPEMI). 
 
The composition of migrant in-flows and out-flows are also impacted by the 
different push-pull factors that influence where people come from and where they go. 
Europe is very attractive to other Europeans, as 60% of the inflow of immigrants into 
Europe in 2006 were of European origin. People emigrating from Asia, however, made 
up over 50% of the total flow to non-European OECD countries. A large number of 
Latin Americans immigrate to non-European OECD countries, and for the most part, 
this represents the large number of Mexicans that journey to the United States. Recent 
years, however, have also seen an increase in the number of Latin Americans moving to 
Spain and Portugal. Approximately 85% of the people emigrating from Northern Africa 
land in Europe, but over 60% of those emigrating from sub-Saharan Africa venture to 
non-European OECD countries. Non-European OECD countries also saw four times as 
many immigrants from South Asia and six to seven times as many immigrants from 
East and Southeast Asia as European countries did. Furthermore, while Poland and 
Romania top the list in Europe as the source countries of immigrants, they produce less 
than half of the immigrants that China does, most of whom move to non-European 
OECD countries (SOPEMI, 2008, 23). And while many people do move from wealthy 
countries to other wealthy countries, over 60% of the world’s migrants are now resident 
in the developed world (Keeley, 2009, 31).  
 
With the increase in global migration, foreign-born people have come to make 
up larger percentages of the populations of many OECD countries. In 2006, foreign-
born people made up 12% of the total population of OECD countries, which was an 
18% increase since the year 2000 (SOPEMI, 2008, 24). Some countries are obviously 
more affected than others, as migrants constitute approximately 25% of the population 
in Switzerland and Australia, yet only 3% of the population in Finland and Hungary. 
While figures on irregular immigrants are hard to gather and hard to verify, it is 
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estimated that irregular migrants make up approximately 3% of the population in most 
developed countries (Keeley, 2009, 44). 
 
The world has also witnessed a significant increase in the number of asylum 
seekers in recent decades, though the numbers have dropped in the past few years. The 
number of refugees throughout the world stood at 2.4 million in 1975, peaked at 18.2 
million in 1993, and has since fallen to a still substantial 12.1 million as of the year 
2000 (Castles, 2003, 11). In 2006, global asylum applications were down for the fourth 
consecutive year, with the United States receiving the most applications (41,000), 
followed by Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (each with between 20-
30,000 applications). Sweden, Austria and Switzerland, however, received the highest 
number of asylum applications when host population size was considered.  
 
 
Figure 2. Inflows of Permanent Migrants to OECD Countries, 2006 
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 Source: SOPEMI, 2008, 29. 
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Figure 3. Foreign-born population in OECD Countries (%), 2000-2006 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
M
ex
ic
o
Tu
rk
ey
H
u
n
ga
ry
Fi
n
a
ln
d
Cz
e
ch
 
R
e
pu
bli
c
Po
rtu
ga
l
D
e
n
m
ar
k
Fr
a
n
ce
N
or
w
ay UK
N
e
th
e
rla
n
ds
O
EC
D
Sp
ai
n
G
e
rm
an
y
Be
lgi
u
m
Sw
ed
en US
Au
s
tri
a
Ire
la
n
d
Ca
n
ad
a
N
ew
 
Ze
al
a
n
d
Au
st
ra
lia
Sw
itz
e
rla
n
d
Lu
x
em
bo
u
rg
2001-2006
2001
 
Source: Keeley, 2009, 34.  
 
 
2.2 European Trends 
Prior to 2002, net migration to the EU had never exceeded 1 million; however, 
from 2002 to 2007, net migration in the EU averaged between 1.64 and 2.03 million 
persons per annum (Eurostat Yearbook, 2009, 166). In 2006 alone, approximately 3.5 
million people settled in a new country within the EU27, with 1.8 million of these 
migrants coming from non-EU countries (Eurostat, 2008, 1). In that same year, the 
largest immigrant groups entering EU27 countries were from Poland (290,000), 
Romania (230,000), Morocco (140,000), the United Kingdom, Ukraine and China (each 
with approximately 100,000), and Germany (90,000) (Eurostat 162/2008, 1). The 
countries that in turn received the most immigrants were Spain (803,000), Germany 
(558,500) and the UK (451,700). Together, these three countries received 60% of all of 
the immigrants in the EU27. When the size of the host population is considered, 
however, it was Luxembourg that accepted the most immigrants (28.8 foreign 
immigrants per 1000 inhabitants), as well as Ireland (19.6), Cyprus (18.7), Spain (18.1) 
and Austria (10.3). The average for the entire European Union was 6.2 foreign 
immigrants per 1000 inhabitants. (Eurostat 162/2008, 1).  
 
For the past decade, net migration has been the most significant cause for 
population change in the European Union. In 2007, the population of the EU27 grew by 
2.4 million people, which marked positive net migration of 1.9 million people with a 
natural population increase of 0.5 million people. The countries with the highest 
positive net migration values from 2002 to 2007 were Spain, Italy, the UK, France and 
Germany. In 2003, there were 2 million more immigrants than emigrants in the 
European Union. We can clearly see then, that the EU has witnessed a significant surge 
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in immigration over the past decade. As a result of the recent global economic decline, 
however, there has been a slight drop in the number of people immigrating to the EU 
over the past two years. Though as mentioned previously, net migration is still positive 
for most EU countries and immigration continues to be a significant source of 
population growth.  
 
When asylum applications in the European Union are considered, the trend is 
quite similar. Of all asylum applications made in industrialized countries over the past 
twenty years, about two-thirds of them were made in the European Union of fifteen 
member states prior to enlargement (Hatton, 2005, 106).  Asylum applications reached 
their peak in the EU in 1992, which saw 670,000 applications made in the EU15. Like 
immigration though, asylum applications have also witnessed a decline over the past 
few years, though the decline has been much more dramatic. In 2001, there were only 
424,000 applications compared to 670,000, and in 2007, there were only 218,900 
applications, which was a slight increase from 2006. (Eurostat Yearbook, 2009, 166). 
This means that since 2001, the number of asylum applications lodged in the EU has 
dropped by half, and if today’s numbers are measured against the recorded peak in 
1992, there has actually been a 70% decline in applications. (Eurostat 110/2007, 2).  
France has seen the largest overall drop in absolute numbers, followed by Austria and 
Germany. This downward trend has not been seen in all countries, however, as Sweden, 
Greece and Hungary all reported an increase in asylum applications in 2006.  
 
 
Table 1. Foreign Immigration, 2006 
 
    Of which (%)   
  Foreign Immigration EU27 Citizens Non-EU27 Citizens 
Immigration per 1000 
inhabitants 
EU27 3,000,000 40 60 6.2 
Spain 803,000 38 62 18.1 
UK 451,700 31 69 7.4 
 
Source: Eurostat News Release 162/2008, 2. 
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Figure 4. Asylum Applications (persons), 1997-2007 
 
 
 Source: Eurostat Yearbook, 2009, 172. 
 
2.3  Trends in Spain 
When compared with immigration dynamics in other European countries over 
the past decade, Spain has clearly experienced quite extraordinary trends.  In early 2000, 
the number of immigrants resident in Spain was less than one million in a country with 
over 40 million people; by early 20091, the number of foreigners residing in Spain had 
already surpassed 5.5 million. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The most current data available when preparing this report (October 2009) was found in the Statistical Use of the 
Municipal Register of Inhabitants by the National Statistics Institute (INE), referring to the population as of 1 January 
2009. 
16 
 
Figure 5. Total Number of Foreigners and Economic Immigrants 2 1996 - 2008  
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Source: Calculated from population data as of 1 January for each year from the 
Statistical Use of Municipal Registry Data (INE) 
 
 
A few simple international comparisons will suffice to illustrate the magnitude 
of both the scope and the rate of the recent immigration influx in Spain: 
 
According to homogeneous data published by the OECD3, Spain is among the 3 
countries with the largest relative presence of immigrants among its population4. 
Moreover, Spain is particularly noteworthy for being the country5 with the largest influx 
of foreigners during the 2000-2007 period in proportion to its size: an increase 
representing 12% of the Spanish population in just 7 years6. 
Regarding Europe during the same period (2000-2007), 16 million non-EU15 
foreigners joined one of the 15 EU countries: 4 million of them, or 25% of the total, 
chose Spain as their destination. 
Although Spain contains only 9% of the population of the 27 countries of the 
EU7, it has captured over 35% of overall EU population growth in the last decade8. This 
increase of over 14% in a 10 year period is extraordinary, and starkly contrasts with the 
slight 3.5% net population increase in the entire EU27 area; 11 of those 14 percentage 
points represent the arrival of new foreign residents. 
                                                 
2 Generally speaking, we use the term "foreigner" to refer to those whose nationality is not Spanish, regardless of 
their birthplace. However, we distinguish those coming from developing or underdeveloped countries as “economic 
immigrants” (sometimes referred to simply as "immigrants" in the text), i.e. immigrants who migrate for economic 
reasons. Foreign nationals of one of the developed European countries (EU or not) or the United States, Canada, 
Japan, Australia or New Zealand (see technical details on this subject in the Technical Annex) are not considered 
"economic immigrants". Such a distinction is analytically necessary because, despite sharing the same general 
description, these immigrant groups share little in common: the reasons for leaving their countries are different, 
conditions of entry and residence differ, their economic capability is unequal, their participation in the labour market 
is not comparable, their living conditions are dissimilar, their prospects for returning are quite different, etc. 
3 OECD International Migration Database consulted in October 2009 
4 Comparative calculation is not simple because there are countries, such as Luxembourg or Switzerland, where a 
huge stock of foreigners but not "economic immigrants" was registered. 
5 Luxembourg actually received the greatest influx, but we have excluded it from this analysis in light of the fact that 
it does not represent "permanent economic migration from developing or underdeveloped countries”, but of persons 
in transit or residents hailing from developed countries. 
6 This ratio is calculated by dividing the influx of foreign population during 2000 – 2007 by the total Spanish 
population in 2000. 
7 Eurostat, 2009 data was consulted in October 2009. 
8 Eurostat. Comparison of the population (provisional for certain countries) from 1 January 2000 to 1 January 2009.  
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The demographic and socio-cultural significance of an event of this magnitude 
could not go unnoticed but it would be worthwhile to underscore its economic impact. It 
should suffice to mention the paradox that, from the early 2000s up to the start of the 
2008 crisis, nearly 5.5 million new jobs9 were created in Spain, yet the growth of the 
Spanish (native) workforce population during this period was negligible10.   
 
 
 
2.3.1 Flow patterns, size, and characteristics of immigrant groups residing in 
Spain  
 
The foreign population with registered residency in Spain as of January 1, 2009 
has reached 12% of the total population, representing 5,598,691 people. The evolution 
of the foreign resident population in Spain shows that immigration flows intensified 
from the early 2000s until 2008 when the current economic downturn caused a 
significant reduction in the rate of entry of economic immigrants. In fact the number of 
registered economic immigrants grew by only slightly more than 125,000 people in 
2008, compared to 385,000 on average over the last three years or 450,000 on average 
in annual terms since 2000. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Growth in employment held between 2000 and the last quarter of 2007 according to quarterly data by the 
Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS) of the INE. 
10 Actually, net growth of the native-born population between 16 and 65 years of age (i.e. potentially economically 
active) was positive, but only by 41,500 people during that eight-year period. 
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Table 2. Influx and Stock data on all immigrants and on economic immigrants 
 
Immigrant Influx Avg. 2000/07 Avg. 2005-2007 2008 
Total Immigrants 
Annual influx 543,110 512,717 329,929 
Yearly growth rate 25% 12% 6% 
Economic Immigrants 
Annual influx 450,154 385,042 125,435 
Yearly growth rate 32% 12% 3% 
Non-economic Immigrants 
Annual influx 92,956 127,675 204,494 
Yearly growth rate 14% 14% 18% 
 
Immigrant Stock 
Data as of 1 January of each year 
1998 2005 2009 
Total Population 39,852,651 44,108,530 46,661,950 
   Total Immigrants 637,085 3,730,610 5,598,691 
   (% of total population)  2% 8% 12% 
   Economic Immigrants 325,385 2,952,207 4,232,769 
   (% of total immigrants) 51% 79% 76% 
   Non-Economic Immigrants 311,700 778,403 1,365,922 
 
Source: Calculated from population data as of 1 January of each year from Statistical 
Use of the Municipal Registry (INE). Final series for 1998 - 2008 and provisional data 
for 1
 
January 2009.  
 
 
According to current data from the State Secretary of Immigration and 
Emigration (SEIE) the total number of undocumented foreigners as of 31 December 
2008 (a figure comparable with the one listed in the Register on 1 January 2009) was 
4,473,499 people. The comparison between the SEIE (4,473,499) and the 
aforementioned Register (5,598,691) is commonly used in Spain to estimate, in spite of 
obvious limitations, the number of undocumented11 immigrants seeking to reside and 
work in Spain12. In early 2009, this method produced a figure of about 1,125,000 
undocumented immigrants, an amount that represents 20% of the registered foreign 
population. Despite the progressive reduction in the percentage of undocumented 
immigration 13 (it averaged 47% between 2002 and 2005 rising to 50% in 2003), the 
number of undocumented foreign residents has also remained quite high since 2003—
                                                 
11 We prefer to use the Spanish terms “indocumentada/o/as/os” (undocumented) or “irregular/es” (unregistered) 
interchangeably rather than the Spanish term "ilegal," which is equivalent to the commonly used English word 
"illegal". Among all of the terms frequently used, the term "illegal" is the most erroneous because the lack of proper 
documentation by a foreigner is not considered a crime in Spain (i.e. it is not included in the Criminal Code), but, 
rather, an administrative misdemeanour. 
12 Data from SEIE account for regular permits of residence and work; in contrast, Municipal Register data accounts 
for every foreigner (regular or irregular) that freely want to register. Registration is quite common, given the fact that 
it is a compulsory requirement for accessing public services, such as health and education.  
13 A significant part of the reduction in this high percentage of undocumented immigrants stemmed from legislative 
changes affecting citizens from Romania and Bulgaria. As of 1 January 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined as full 
members of the European Union. Although the Spanish government issued a two-year moratorium that limited their 
effective right to apply for an employee work permit, citizens of Romania and Bulgaria enjoyed the same rights as 
any other EU citizen to enter Spain, become self-employed, pursue studies, or simply seek residence.  
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easily surpassing one million individuals and even reaching the 1.8 million mark in 
2005 (see Annex Table A.1). 
 
Spain has also witnessed a gradual increase in the number of asylum 
applications that it receives. Like most other EU countries, Spain experienced an 
increase in asylum applications between 1999 and 2001, which peaked in 2001 at 9,490 
applications (see Table 3).  In 2007, Spain received 7,195 applications, which is a 
considerable increase from the 4,975 applications it received in 1997. (Eurostat 
Yearbook, 2009, 172). While Spain has undergone an increase in the number of asylum 
applications it receives, it is important to note that Spain actually receives very modest 
numbers of asylum applications compared to other EU countries. Between 1997 and 
2007, Spain received an average of 6,428 asylum applications per year. This is 
considerably lower than the 62,821 applications that Germany received on average, as 
well as the 53,834 applications that the UK received and the 39,980 applications that 
France received over the same time period. 
 
 
Table 3. Total Number of First Asylum Applications 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total    Number 4,975 4,934 8,405 7,926 9,490 6,309 5,918 5,553 5,257 5,297 7,664 
 
Source: Ministry of Interior, Asylum and Refugee Office. 
 
 
As Table 3 demonstrates, applications for asylum in Spain are very low 
compared to other EU countries like Germany, the UK or Switzerland, and the number 
of applications have hardly increased between 1997 and 2007 (4,975 to 7,664). These 
numbers are striking when compared to the large increase in the foreign population in 
Spain, which has risen from 241,971 in 1985 to 4,625,191 in 2009 (Cornelius, 2004, 
p.388) (Informe Trimestral  Junio, 2009, p. 5).    
 
 
Table 4. Asylum and Migration Data – Total Number of Decisions 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 
  Total First 
Instance 
First 
Appeal 
Total First 
Instance 
First 
Appeal 
Total First 
Instance 
First 
Appeal 
Total First 
Instance 
First 
Appeal 
Total  9,591 6,625 2,966 8,185 4,857 3,328 8,398 4,248 4,150 7,597 6,640 1,317 
Positive   233 161 72 285 202 83 212 168 44 233 225 8 
Negative 8,689 6,301 2,388 6,634 4,531 2,103 7,567 3,892 3,675 7,367 6,070 1,297 
Other 669 163 506 1,266 124 1,142 619 188 431 357 345 12 
 
Source: Own Elaboration. Data from European Migration Network, 2009. 
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The above table shows that only a small percentage of the lodged applications 
are accepted. Also, the positive decisions have been constant from the 2004-2007 period 
and few appeals are successful. 
 
When it comes to the origin of all categories of registered migrants, we can see 
in Table 5, four nationalities make up 60% of ‘regular’ immigrants living in Spain. 
 
 
Table 5. Origin of economic immigration (Regular residents by country of origin and 
percentage of total economic immigration) 
 
Main Countries of Origin 
Country Stock Percentage 
Romania 718,844 20% 
Morocco 717,416 20% 
Ecuador 421,527 12% 
Colombia 274,832 8% 
Bulgaria 144,401 4% 
China 138,558 4% 
Group Total :  66% 
 
Source: Prepared from SEIE data (as of 31 December 2008). 
 
 
An analysis of trends shows stronger growth in recent years of immigration from 
other European countries (particularly from underdeveloped countries that are now EU 
members) in contrast to a tendency toward reduced immigration flows from African 
countries and, to a lesser extent, from Latin America. 
 
With respect to basic demographics, that is to say age and gender, the 
comparative graph below shows Native – Immigrant population pyramids. 
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Figure 6.  Relative (*) population pyramids for Natives - Immigrants (**) 
 
Women-Immigrants Men-Immigrants
Women-Spanish Men-Spanish
 
 
Source: Calculated from population data as of 1 January of each year from Statistical 
Use of the Municipal Registry (INE). 
(*)Bars representing natives and immigrants are shown separately in order to highlight 
the importance of each age level within its own respective group. As such, they should 
only be considered to represent the percentage of each age level within its 
corresponding group, WITHOUT indicating the relative percentages between National / 
immigrant groups in each age level. 
(**) Data on immigrants refers to economic immigration, not to the total number of 
foreign residents (see technical note 2 on this subject). 
 
 
The above graph illustrates the following demographic characteristics:  
 
• Parity between men and women: Taking into account both Municipal 
Registry data as well as documented residency information (SEIE)14, men 
made up about 53% of the immigrant population.  In aggregate terms, trends 
toward rising numbers of females or males among immigrant groups have 
not been observed. Despite this general parity, gender figures by nationality 
differ in comparison with the overall average: while "only" 46% of Latin 
American immigrants are men, this percentage rises to 64% for Africans15. 
These differences reveal different family migration patterns according to 
point of origin, although we cannot say at this point if the causes are only a 
                                                 
14 Both sets of data refer to the same period, 31 December 2008 for the SEIE and 1 January 2009 for the municipal 
register. 
15 Provisional data refers to the Statistical Use of the Municipal Register as of 1 January 2009. 
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cultural phenomenon or if they are also influenced by gender issues affecting 
admission policy and/or the ease in joining the workforce. 
 
• Relative youth of immigrants residing in Spain: The average weighted age of 
immigrants is about 33 years old (32 in the case of women) compared with 
41 years of age for the Spanish population. This age distribution is 
associated with the essentially work-related aspect of immigrants arriving in 
Spain, particularly during the early years. Approximately 85% of the 
immigrant population fall into the potentially active age group category, 
which corresponds to the age range of the workforce, whereas only 67% of 
the native population falls into this category. On the other hand, the impact 
of their relative youth in demographic terms has become apparent in such 
important areas as the birth rate as 24% of births in 2008 involved a foreign 
mother and/or father16. 
 
The geographical distribution of immigrants in Spain does not correspond 
exactly with the distribution of the native population (see Annex Table A.2). On one 
hand, immigrants appear to be somewhat more concentrated across the national 
territory: the concentration index17 is 14% as opposed to 10% for nationals. On the other 
hand, the regional distribution diverges between nationals and immigrants for two very 
distinct and complementary reasons in general terms 18: first and foremost, the different 
degree of employment opportunities in each of the Spanish regions, and, secondly, the 
dissimilar amount of important cities, urban centres that tend to act as migration 
magnets. For example, Catalonia and Madrid, two of the most urban and economically 
active regions in Spain, attract 23% and 22% of the immigrant population respectively, 
which represents half of the immigrant population coming from developing countries. 
 
This concentration phenomenon has important implications in terms of 
integration, regional parity and development which should be considered essential when 
analyzing the circumstances and outlook for immigration in Spain. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Vital Statistics (INE). Data refers to births by nationality of the mother and father in 2008 (published on 4 June 
2009). 
17 Measured with a traditional, non-standardized Herfindahl index using percentages of population distribution by 
Region of native and immigrant populations. The standardized index would produce a value of 0.047 for natives as 
opposed to 0.084 for immigrants. 
18 There exist specific reasons why certain regions have a larger or smaller immigrant presence. For example, the 
high rate of immigration in Murcia, due to agricultural needs ,cannot be explained by  the region’s per capita income 
of 83% of the national average. At the other end, the low rate of immigration in the Basque Country, which is likely 
due to a greater difficulty to integrate (e.g. language barrier) does not correlate with a per capita income representing 
131% of the national average. 
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Figure 7.  Percentage of Economic Immigrants and Relative per Capita Income 
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Source: Percentage of immigrants coming from underdeveloped countries with respect 
to the total population: Calculations based on provisional data as of 1 January 2009 
from the Statistical Use of the Municipal Register (INE). Relative per capita income: 
Spanish Regional Accounts (INE). Base 2000. 1st Estimate for 2007 (INE). Regression 
line excludes the regions of Murcia and the Basque Country. 
 
 
 
2.3.2  Analysis of the causes of immigration in Spain 
 
The influx of immigration in Spain may be due to the confluence in time of two 
very powerful “pull” factors: 
 
An economic factor: strong economic growth based on sectors dependent on 
intensive manual and low-skilled labour that the native workforce is neither able nor 
willing to perform. 
A demographic factor: a relative scarcity of population in the potentially active 
age group due to an aging population. 
 
These two phenomena generated an initial wave of immigration from the outset 
of 2000 that exceeded all forecasts. A tolerant immigration policy is also mentioned 
frequently as one possible explanation for the influx of immigrants into Spain, but we 
do not believe it to be a root cause. In fact, an argument against the idea of immigration 
policy as a pull factor is that over the course of many years, the entry of large numbers 
of immigrants has occurred unevenly, which is inconsistent with the idea that lax rules 
of admission are to blame. 
 
Indeed, since the early 2000s, many newly arrived immigrants did not enter via 
normal channels but through clandestine or unauthorized means, whereas others who 
had initially used legal channels later dropped into undocumented status. How can one 
explain the fact that such a high degree of unregulated immigration did not hinder the 
arrival of new immigrants?  In our view, the reason is relatively simple: first, although 
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migration policy did not grant legal admission to a large number of immigrants, the vast 
majority of them did manage to find jobs thanks to the size of the informal labour 
market in Spain. Moreover, various "amnesty" or “regularization” processes that 
granted legal residency to successive groups of undocumented residents acted as a final 
safeguard in the expectations of new immigrants. 
 
Apart from economic and demographic reasons that explain the initial years of 
the immigration process, immigration became a dynamic factor that stimulated itself. 
Immigrants already settled have formed networks intended to attract or provide shelter 
for new immigrants. Spain has become an international destination of choice among the 
main migration destinations, even though the conditions that were so attractive appear 
to be waning. 
 
This analytical framework is based on disparate migration theories: the case of 
Spain, as with all other contemporary migration patterns, does not easily fit into any 
single theoretical proposal. Ultimately, we would argue that the pull factors that have 
encouraged immigration to Spain are the key factors in understanding the evolution of 
immigration to Spain, and not any push factors present in countries of origin. Although 
it is assumed that these characteristics "at origin" promote emigration and perhaps had 
an impact on aspects such as the "composition" of immigrant flows (by nationality, for 
example) they are a “necessary” precondition but not a “sufficient” circumstance to 
explain the wave of immigration in Spain. 
 
 
 
2.3.2.1 The economic cause of immigration or the “glorious decade” of the 
Spanish economy  
 
Given the current economic situation, no expert would currently describe the 
years of economic growth from 2000 to 2008 as "glorious". However, before the arrival 
of the current crisis affecting growth and employment, the figures were persuasively 
revealing: 
 
• The real GDP growth between 2001 and 2008 was 3.5%, the second largest in 
the EU12; 
• During this period of extraordinary growth, 4.7 million new jobs were 
created (7.3 million since 1996); and 
• Although the Spanish job market represents only 9% of the overall EU27 
market, it was responsible for creating 31% of all EU employment between 
2001 and 2007. 
 
The reason for this extraordinary job growth is that labour-intensive job sectors 
played a major role in the Spanish growth model. Thus, industry (traditionally 
responsible for more than 20% of workforce demand between 1996 and 2000) gave way 
to building (which rose from 9% to 23% in terms of contribution) and services (largely 
services related to building and market services with negligible added value). 
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Figure 8. Contribution to Spanish growth of Non-Agricultural Economic Sectors 
Comparison of 1996-2000 with 2001-2007 
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Source: Calculations based on current weights for each sector and year to year growth 
rates of their chain-linked volume indexes 1996-2007. Base 2000 (provisional estimate 
for 2007) National Statistics Institute (INE). 
 
 
This model, which proved to be extremely effective in converting economic 
growth into employment, was nevertheless highly pro-cyclical and vulnerable 19 and 
thus Spain is currently suffering the greatest impact on its job market. 
 
Returning to the immigration scene of recent years, it should be stated that this 
huge increase in labour demand could only be partially covered by the native workforce, 
due to a combination of three complementary factors: 
 
• A slight increase in the native potential workforce (population between ages 
16 and 65) at a rate of about 75,000 people a year; 
• A slight increase in the rate of the native activity rate of about half a 
percentage point per year; and 
• A small rise in the native employment rate of 3.5 percentage points 
accumulated over the eight years mentioned. 
 
The combination of these three factors meant that there were "only" 2 million 
native employees to meet the labour demand, so the balance (to cover the 4.7 million 
jobs created) were filled by immigrants. These immigrants had not previously taken up 
residence in Spain (the total number of economic immigrants living in Spain in 2000 
was only 500,000 people). Rather, they came from abroad, generating one of the most 
intense voluntary immigration flows ever recorded in Europe. Nearly 4.5 million 
foreigners entered Spain between 2001 and 2008, with 3.6 million coming from poor 
                                                 
19 The vulnerability associated with the extremely pro-cyclical nature of work in key sectors of the economy, along 
with heightened labour intensity as well as other factors such as the precarious nature of the work itself (due, among 
other reasons, to their temporary and dual or segmented nature). 
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countries. Around 90%20 of this population entered the workforce with the firm 
intention of getting a job, and a total of 2.7 million immigrants eventually succeeded in 
finding employment. 
 
It can be observed, therefore, that at the foundation of the arrival of these 
immigrants, there is a layer of demographic decline that deserves a closer, albeit brief, 
study in the following section. 
 
 
 
2.3.2.1 Ageing population and immigration 
 
In 2005, the “World Population Ageing” Report by the United Nations placed 
Spain in 2050 as the most aged population on Earth, and more recently, the OECD 
report "A Statistical Overview of 2007" situated Spain in 2050 as the third most elderly 
country in the group, behind only Japan and Korea. 
 
The ageing process in Spain is a phenomenon that has been evident since the 
middle of the last century, although it has become much more pronounced in recent 
decades. On one hand, the proportion of people over 64 has grown significantly, from 
7% in 1950 to 17% in 2001. On the other hand, the percentage of children under age 15 
declined in the same period from 26% to 14%. Because of these two opposing trends, 
the ageing index (calculated as the percentage of people over 64 years per 100 children 
under age 15) multiplied by 4 in only 50 years from 28 in 1950 to 117 in 2001. It makes 
sense to infer that demographic trends, coupled with a progressively greater delay in 
joining the Spanish job market, has given rise to an insufficient population base to meet 
labour demand, especially if one considers the high rate of economic growth and, 
consequently, the intense demand for workers. 
 
Most notions on ageing promoted by the European Union, the United Nations, 
the ILO, and UNESCO, associate immigration with ageing, and, for developed 
countries, it is often referred to as a palliative factor for its economic impact. The 
Guidelines for Employment Policies (2003-2005) included the need for countries to 
"address […] the deficit in manual labour and paucity in the job market […] by taking 
immigration into account".  The EU Commission also noted in the Green Paper on The 
EU approach towards Management of Economic Immigration "... the need to review 
long-term immigration policies..." stating that "even if Lisbon employment targets are 
reached in 2010, overall employment levels will fall due to demographic changes” and 
thus "...steady immigration flows will become increasingly necessary to meet the needs 
of the EU labour market and to ensure Europe's prosperity". 
 
Apart from the global figures for dependency rates 21, the association between 
the demographic base and labour market demands are relevant to the context of 
immigration. In this sense, a simple calculation can be made that illustrates the 
                                                 
20 The 90% activity rate corresponds to the EAPS data from INE at the end of 2008. The average activity rate for the 
2001 - 2008 period is obviously somewhat lower. 
21 The evolution of the dependency rate in recent years shows two opposing forces: on the one hand, the widening of 
the population pyramid at older age groups, and on the other hand, a reduction in the youngest group. These 
competing factors have helped stabilize the overall dependency rate which gives the erroneous impression of an 
adequate labour supply, when in reality, the ageing factor has a much more striking impact on the real rate of "work" 
dependence than does a numerical decline in the youngest individuals. 
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progressive shortage in native population supply by annually comparing individuals 
entering the potentially active age group (16 years) with those exiting the same group at 
age 65. This calculation illustrates that in the early '70s, this variant of the "replacement 
rate" was 2.0 and reached 2.3 in the early 80s when baby boomers began to join the 
workforce. However, the "baby boom effect" came to an end22 in the early '90s and the 
replacement ratio fell to 1.1 in 1999 where it has remained until the present. This lower 
rate of replacement obviously implies an increase in the average age of the potential 
workforce, moving from 37 years old in 1970 to an average of 39 years of age currently. 
  
Using the Economically Active Population Survey provided by the INE as a 
database, we can illustrate the shortage of native labour supply with a few simple 
calculations. Given the reported employment rates and the real population base, the 
native labour supply would have been exhausted, at best, in the last quarter of 200423. 
The only two unlikely alternatives to immigration to prevent a breakdown in the labour 
supply would have been: an increase in the native population between 16 and 64 years 
of over 4.5 million people between 1996 and the end 200724 (actual growth was only 
600,000 people); or a rise in the workforce employment rate to 86%25 (the current rate is 
about 70%). 
 
 
 
3. The Evolution of Immigration Policy 
 
It comes as no surprise that given these momentous changes in international 
migration trends, policy makers around the world have had to react and adapt their 
policy responses.  Spanish immigration policy in particular has undergone significant 
changes over the three decades.   
 
Having earlier been a ‘country of emigration’, Spain adopted its first Organic 
Law regulating the entry and stay of foreigners26 in 1985 before joining the EEC. This 
law outlined the rights and obligations of foreigners inside the country with restrictions 
based on the notion that, following membership, Spain would be considered by 
potential migrants as a transit country in order to reach other Member States - 
traditional receivers. Immigration was not regarded as a phenomenon which would 
persist, so the steadiness of residence permits, as well as family reunification and 
integration were not issues of particular interest. It is important to point out that 
monitoring immigration flows should not be limited only to entry control, because a 
large number of undocumented immigrants entered initially through legal channels. 
Many of them come from visa exemption countries, others come with tourist visas or 
with short stay permits, but then remain once their permit has expired. As a result, to 
control the immigration influx, it is also necessary to monitor the duration of stays 
which represents a much more difficult task (Arango, 2005). 
 
                                                 
22 The phenomenon known as the “baby boom” occurred in Spain between 1957 and 1977, so those born during that 
period would have reached 16 years of age between 1973 and 1993 respectively. 
23 The calculation was made by adding the total number of local and immigrant employees and dividing that overall 
employment figure by the real active native population. 
24 The calculation was carried out by dividing the active native and immigrant population by the real employment rate 
observed for the native population. 
25 The calculation was carried out by adding employed and unemployed immigrants to the total active native 
population and then dividing that total by the potentially active real native population. 
26 OL 7/1985 
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At the beginning of the nineties, although the number of immigrants had still not 
grown substantially, diversification of immigrants’ countries of origin could be 
observed. It was at this time that government authorities began considering the 
economic transcendence of immigration flows and the need for regulation as a result of 
the increasing demand for workers. In 1993 annual contingents27 began to be used28, but 
it was not until 2002 that they became a main instrument in the hiring process. Visa 
policies for immigrants proceeding from principal sending countries were adopted in the 
early nineties, and issues related to border protection, flow control, combating illegal 29 
immigration, deportation as well as integration of documented immigrants began to 
come under scrutiny. In 1994, the General Direction of Migrations30 was created and the 
Plan for Social Integration of Immigrants was adopted. Consequently, regulations 
relating to the right to family reunification as well as the introduction of permanent 
residence permits were initiated in 1996 with the modification of the Ordinance of the 
1985 law. 
 
Even though immigration was becoming more noteworthy in labour and 
economic policy, estimates regarding its volume and speed did not reflect the scale of 
what was actually taking place. The growing need for workers and the increasing 
number of new entries during the second half of the nineties urged the modification of 
existing legislation in an attempt to adapt it to real necessities. The fact that the demand 
for labour in some regions and economic sectors could not be satisfied by native 
workers led to the signing of an agreement between the Government, Trade Unions and 
Employer Organizations in 1999 enabling the temporary hiring of foreign workers in 
their countries of origin when the native supply of workers was insufficient. 
 
In an attempt to respond to changing circumstances, the Government proceeded 
urgently with a project for the modification of the OL 7/1985. In January 2000 the OL 
4/2000 on the Rights and Obligations of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration 
came into force. Worthy of note is the major importance placed on integration and the 
concession of increased rights to immigrants such as free health services and education 
for all 31. Hence, the structural character of immigration was recognised. 
 
Significantly, the adoption of this law led to a trend of political polarization over 
immigration issues which has been growing steadily ever since, becoming, in fact, a 
particular bone of contention over the last few years. The main political parties 
represented in Parliament32, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the 
People’s Party (PP)33, which normally maintain opposing positions on important matters 
of State, have demonstrated clear disagreement regarding the design and 
                                                 
27 The final aim of this procedure was the quantification and description of the necessities of workforce that could not 
be satisfied with workers from the local market through job offers processed in the country of origin. 
28 The annual contingent varied from 15,000 to approximately 30,000 new work permissions. Such contingents were 
also used in Italy. Some other EU countries considered this option in the last few years, but only for highly skilled 
immigrants necessary in certain economic sectors.  
29 Illegal immigration refers to immigration across national borders in a way that violates the immigration laws of 
Spain. 
30 In Spain, a “Dirección General de Immigración” is an administrative office in a third level range, right after the 
Ministry range and the Secretary–General range. 
31 Including undocumented immigrants. 
32 With a similar number of representatives. 
33 In the Spanish political scene, PSOE is defined as a progressivism party and PP is a centre–right conservative 
party.  
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implementation of immigration policy. Indeed, this on-going confrontation has posed an 
obstacle in the decision-making and management regarding this important topic.  
 
The controversies resulting from the adoption of the OL 4/2000 legislative text 
contributed further to this political polarization34 and led to additional difficulties in 
combining such opposing visions into a coherent immigration policy. Such was the 
widespread political disagreement regarding the stipulations of OL 4/2000 that some 
months after its entry into force, the People’s Party, after winning an absolute majority 
in the 2000 elections, launched a modification aimed at moulding a more restrictive law. 
This substantially reduced immigrants’ rights35 and expanded the Administration’s 
range of action to control and manage the influxes based on the GRECO Program36 - an 
integral plan on political coordination and immigration regulation.   
 
Apart from reasons of political conviction, the adoption of the OL 8/2000 also 
aimed to respond to international commitments relating to this matter, in particular to 
encompass the principles adopted by the Prime Ministers and Presidents of the EU 
Member States during their meeting on October 16 and 17, 1999 in Tampare37  
regarding the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice38, as well the Schengen 
community patrimony on entry controls, visa issuance, regulation of stay and the 
carrier’s responsibility and sanctions. The new law came into force in January 2001 
modifying the previous OL 4/2000 which had been adopted less than one year before.    
 
The most important modifications related to deportations as immigrants who 
were working without valid permits were prioritized, and increased penalties were 
applied to businesses found to be employing such immigrants without requiring 
documentation. Also included were stipulations for new conditions relating to family 
reunification and unaccompanied minors. In addition, sanctions to combat the 
trafficking of human beings were empowered. In short, the reinforcement of the fight 
against illegal immigration was an important characteristic of OL 8/2000, along with an 
emphasis on enhanced border control and diversification, such as the introduction of the 
Intensive External Vigilance System in the Canary Islands and in the Gibraltar Strait. 
 
It can also be noted that the responsibilities of the Ministry of Interior39 
increased in 2000 when the position of Secretary of State for Immigration and 
Emigration was created and given extensive power in matters relating to immigration. 
 
As in other EU Member States, immigration policy in Spain has undergone 
important changes since 11 September 2001, placing more emphasis on security related 
questions. A legislative modification was introduced with the OL 14/2003, owing to 
diverse circumstances which had occurred during the previous two laws which entailed 
                                                 
34 Taking into account the consolidating economic situation at the time and the desire to prevent an excessive increase 
in immigration flows, the centre-right parties called for more restricted admission of immigrants. 
35 Especially undocumented immigrants’ rights, but also included the acquiring of permanent residence after five 
years of continuous residence. Permanent residence authorises the individual to live in Spain indefinitely and to enjoy 
the same working conditions as the Spanish. 
36 In Spanish, the acronym means “Programa Global de Coordinación y Regulación de la Extranjería y la 
Inmigración” 
37 Using the possibilities offered by the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
38 In this sense, it indicated common criterion directives for the development of asylum and migration policies: the 
management of migration flows, fair treatment of third country nationals (and their integration), a common European 
asylum system and partnership with countries of origin. 
39 Previously assigned to the Ministry of Labour and approximately two years ago they were transferred back to the 
Ministry of Labour and Immigration. 
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the need to adapt legislation to the continuous changes of the immigration phenomenon 
in Spain. The considerable increase in the number of foreign residents in the preceding 
years, together with changes in entry channels and lengths of stay of immigrants in 
Spain, had generated more knowledge on this phenomenon and led to the introduction 
of new regulation instruments which would enable an improved and simplified 
ordinance of migration influxes, although this was not actually achieved. Other 
proposals began to surface regarding the increased allocation of resources to facilitate 
documented immigration and additional reinforcement of the mechanisms to fight 
illegal immigration, human trafficking and deportation.  
 
Border control became a primary focus once again. Measures to promote 
collaboration with transport companies were introduced with a view to gathering more 
information on people transferring into Spanish territory. It was hoped that such 
information would help improve the existing instruments guaranteeing the security of 
international transport, especially by air. The OL 14/2003 allowed the Ministry of the 
Interior to obtain data on documented and undocumented immigrants registered in the 
municipalities40.  
 
The determination of visa types and their terms and the fight against the 
fraudulent use of administrative proceedings also became top priorities. All of this was 
aimed at facilitating documented immigration as well as the integration of foreigners 
entering and staying in Spain through these legally established channels. 
 
Although there are many common characteristics during those years, taking into 
account the legislation developments described above, three distinctive stages can be 
highlighted. The first relates to the establishment of a legal basis for entry and stay, the 
second relates to the presumption that immigration would be lasting, and therefore saw 
the introduction of social integration and family reunification, and the third relates to 
the reinforcement of security related issues. Ultimately, however, Spanish immigration 
policy cannot be regarded as very restrictive41 during the aforementioned years.  
 
One important distinctive characteristic of Spanish immigration policy, in 
contrast to other European (and in particular Northern) states, is that following every 
legislative change, one or more mass regularizations have been carried out42.  
 
It was highlighted earlier in the report that the chronic persistence and increase 
of undocumented foreigners is one of the most important characteristics of the 
immigration process in Spain. As a result, six regularization programs have been 
implemented during the short but intense period of time in which the country has 
become the main immigration receiver in the EU. 
 
Even in 1986 when immigration was not yet a large-scale phenomenon, the first 
regularization process was put into practice for the immigrants residing in the country 
before the entry into force of OL 7/1985. In its nine-month duration, 43,815 
                                                 
40 As well as the urgent deportation of foreigners considered dangerous for the National Security. 
41 Especially when its implementation is taken into account. 
42 Italy, and to a certain extent, Greece and Portugal adopted similar practices.  It is important to add that the principal 
source of the increase in undocumented immigrants was in the case of foreigners arriving as tourists but who then 
exceeded their permitted legal stay with the aim of accessing the job market (with or without a regular labour contract 
or irregular way). We also have to consider nationals coming from countries with visa exemptions, free transit 
through EU borders, and vessels arriving from Africa in a clandestine manner. 
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applications were presented of which 87% were resolved favourably. Although the 
second regularization scheme in 1991 was directed at immigrants who had arrived after 
the first process and who were working undocumented in the country, it did recognise 
that some of the people regularized in the first process had become undocumented 
again. So, in 1991, all foreign citizens who could demonstrate a solid job offer or new 
business project were invited to submit applications. On that occasion, 135,393 
applications were presented and 84% of them were granted (Arango and Suarez, 2002). 
The need to carry out a second regularization in only a few years when the immigrant 
population in Spain was still relatively insignificant shows the Government’s 
inadequate management of immigrant influxes, in spite of this being an essential aim of 
immigration policy. 
 
The predominance of labour immigrants can be seen in all regularization 
processes, as well as the unexpected increase of unregistered foreigners and the policy’s 
clear failure in preventing further need for large-scale regularizations, which have since 
become commonplace in the last ten years. Thus, in 1996 a third process was organised, 
in which applicants had to demonstrate sufficient economic means and health insurance 
for the period of stay applied for. Of the 24,691 foreigners who filed applications, 70% 
were applying for work permits. 
 
From this point on, despite the continued increases in the presence of 
undocumented migrants, the government came to routinely rely on large-scale 
regularization programs rather than trying to come up with new ways of addressing this 
growing problem. Thus, in 1998 another amnesty process was scheduled. After the 
adoption of OL 4/2000, a four-month period was announced in which all foreigners who 
could prove employment settlement43 and who could provide evidence of their arrival 
prior to June 1999 were invited to apply. Out of 246,086 applications44 60% were 
resolved favourably (Arango and Suarez, 2002). We can suppose that the vast majority 
were newcomers, since only 6% of the applications presented were from immigrants 
who had lost their previous permits, and it is logical that once an initial work permit is 
obtained, the owner does not lose the possibility of renewing it. In this case, the fact that 
the permits issued were not linked to particular geographic or economic sectors could be 
considered as a shortcoming45.   
 
The following year, after the passage of OL 8/2000, the next regularization 
process took place, designed to deal with applications rejected in the previous process; a 
large number of them were, once again, resolved favourably. 
 
The intense increase in the stock of unregistered immigrants in 2004-2005 
required a new “exceptional” Government intervention which was dubbed the 
“extraordinary regularization process”. As before, the target was labour immigration on 
the grounds that an estimated 800,000 immigrants were working without administrative 
                                                 
43 
The procedure called “arraigo laboral” (stable work situation)  is an exceptional circumstance that may entitle a 
foreign person to obtain a residence authorization. It basically applies to those persons that can provide evidence of 
having remained in Spain continuously for a number of years (at least 2 years, in current legislation) have no criminal 
records either in Spain or in his or her country of origin, and can prove the existence of an employment relationship 
of no less than one year of duration. 
44 90% were work permit applications. 
45 An example being the fact that many immigrants who obtained permission for employment in agriculture quickly 
changed to better jobs, leaving farmers once again without sufficient workers. 
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authorization46 and, therefore, without a labour contract.  This “irregular work” in the 
shadow economy has well known prejudicial effects on the economic health of a 
country and its labour market, and must be considered the main obstacle to the social 
integration of immigrants. In this case, the Socialist Government simply did what any 
Government would have had to do sooner or later (Sandell, 2005), by providing a 
solution to failures in the legal system. The OL 14/2003 was the first law which did not 
include regularization processes, but rather included it in the Ordinance, and so the last 
and largest regularization process was implemented in 2005. Around 700,000 
applications were filed with 87% being resolved favourably47. Nonetheless, even after 
this regularization process, at the end of 2005 there were about 1,400,000 
undocumented immigrants according to the municipalities’ registries.  
 
The current economic crisis has entailed an excess of workers which in turn has 
promoted the adoption of restrictive measures for the admission of new immigrants, 
further family reunifications and the renewal of permits for unemployed immigrants 
residing in Spain, etc. One measure introduced by the Government in 2008 was the 
capitalization of unemployment benefits for people with the aim to commit people to 
return to their countries of origin 48, but the result was unsatisfactory. The only measure 
of this kind envisaged in the new legislative reform in the case of unemployment is 
voluntary return. According to data from the OECD, only 4,000 immigrants out of a 
possible 80,000 actually enrolled in the program by the end of March 2009. 
 
Along the same lines, a further measure affected the annual contingent for 2009, 
namely the Government’s decision to reduce the number of job authorizations to 900. 
On 23 July 2009, a Royal Decree modifying the Ordinance of OL 4/2000 was adopted, 
which stipulated that initial work permits fall into the remit of the Autonomous Region 
labour authorities 49 with the participation of the State authorities. This measure could in 
fact have been very useful in the past when a strong regional demand for workers 
existed but could not be satisfied owing to rigidity and slow processing, and which in 
many cases obliged businesses to employ immigrants without work permits. Another 
modification is that foreign students and researchers can obtain work permissions after 
three years of stay and on completion of their studies50.  
 
A new reform in the legislation which comprises strengthening sanctions for 
immigrants working without the necessary documentation through an increase in 
deportations has been adopted51 in Parliament. Internment of undocumented immigrants 
is intended to be expanded to up to 60 days in the Internment Centre for Foreigners 
(CIE) as well possible fines of up to Euros 10,000. In addition, sanctions are envisaged 
for people registering foreigners in their municipality who do not usually live at the 
declared address. This could prevent some undocumented immigrants from obtaining 
free health services, because one of the conditions to obtain health services is that they 
must be registered in the municipality where they live. 
                                                 
46 The primary aim was to register undocumented immigrant workers. 
47 The available statistics contemplated them separately until the end of 2005, when they became part of the total 
stock. As a result, further information on their actual status is not available. 
48 With payment of 40% before leaving and the remaining 60% 30 days after arrival in the country of origin.  
49 Limited geographically to the Autonomous Region in which the permit was issued. 
50 If they were not beneficiaries of scholarships granted by public or private entities in origin upon programmes for 
cooperation and development. 
51 With disagreement of the People’s Party which announced that they will modify it immediately if they reach the 
government, as the Socialist Party did not accept PP parliamentary amendments.  
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The identification and treatment of unaccompanied minors has also witnessed 
enhanced restrictions, including the right to legal aid. The requirement to provide 
increased documentary evidence of lack of economic means in order to be eligible for a 
court-appointed attorney would limit access to legal defence for people denied entry at 
airports or other points of repatriation origin. In many cases, the necessary documents 
could not be gathered within the timeframe of repatriation.  Moreover, new 
reinforcement of policy control measures regarding the entry and deportation of third 
country nationals is considered.  
 
A further restriction included in the new law52 is that only immigrants with more 
than five years of documented residence can reunite with parents or grandparents older 
than 65 years. Unfortunately, there are no further plans to address the issue of chain 
reunification, which should be legally addressed now as it could become the main 
source of immigration increases in the near future. It is noteworthy that during the 
period of 2002-2008, only 2,500 of the 500,000 people who reunited with their families 
in Spain were older than 65 years. 
 
All of these changes were adopted in a parliamentary session recently and 
additional modifications were introduced. Following the recommendations of the 
Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 29 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment53, extensive 
support was given by the main parliamentary groups. According to the European Union 
Justice Commissioner Franco Frattini, Europe draws only about 5% of the skilled 
foreign workforce - compared to the 55% who head for the United States. Actually, “the 
experience of the recent past in which some sectors have been consistently reporting 
labour shortages (e.g. the IT sector, health services, building) shows that it is not 
necessarily easy to solve these shortages by tapping into the native workforce” (EC, 
2003). 
 
In sum, while one has been able to observe some restrictive trends in recent 
years, overall it remains true that “…the mechanism for generating regular immigration 
opportunities to satisfy the demand for immigrant labour has been hopelessly under-
dimensioned and extremely inefficient in the past” (Sandell, 2005).  Ultimately, large 
scale regularizations have perhaps been the most distinctive feature of Spanish 
immigration policy in recent years. 
 
 
 
4. The Impact of Immigration in Spain 
 
The significant impact of immigration on Europe’s economic and social 
landscape over the past two decades has perhaps been particularly pronounced in Spain.   
 
4.1 Participation in the workforce 
 
                                                 
52 Only direct members of the family could reunify according to the law reform. 
53 Germany, for instance, adopted preference for highly qualified immigration years ago. France recently followed 
suit. In short, this is a common interest which forms part of the Common Migration Policy. 
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The arrival of immigrants in Spain has been uniquely associated with their 
participation in a job market with a noteworthy shortage of native workers. From this 
standpoint, economic integration of immigrants has gone hand in hand with existing 
demand for labour, and this fact represents a key point to understanding the dynamics of 
immigration, determining the level of integration/acceptance within the community, and 
discerning future prospects. 
 
The following points sum up the main characteristics of the immigrant 
population54 in contrast to the native population with regard to their activity in the 
Spanish labour market. These figures make it possible to highlight certain aspects of 
interest: 
 
• As seen in the Municipal Register population figures, potentially active 
workers over 16 years of age are more numerous among the immigrant 
population (in relative terms); 
• As for the working age population, the rate of those who are actively seeking 
employment (Activity rate) is also notably higher among immigrants (77%) 
than natives (58%), which underscores the worker-rich profile of 
immigration flow. 
• The average activity rate also obscures some important differences in 
specific age groups. Thus, above the obligatory schooling age, activity rates 
rise among immigrants with respect to natives for both the first group 16-24, 
as well as the second 25-34. 
• Of those actively seeking employment, the employment rate is substantially 
higher for natives both before and after the current economic crisis (90% 
versus 83% pre-recession and 84% versus 72% pre-recession). 
• The total number of employed immigrants was nearly 3 million before the 
current recession, which represents about 15% of the total Spanish active 
workforce (14% during current recession levels). 
• With respect to distribution of natives and immigrants across employment 
sectors, we must always make a distinction based on gender: the Spanish job 
market has a very clear gender segmentation which is even more pronounced 
with respect to immigrants. 
• Prior to and after the economic crisis, about 90% of immigrant women 
worked in the service sector. This enormous percentage is not vastly 
different from the figure for Spanish women, approximately 85% of whom 
are also concentrated in this sector. 
• Male immigrants were employed before the recession in the building sector 
(40%) and market services (40%) with a smaller presence in the industrial 
sector (16%). This distribution revealed important differences with natives, 
whose presence in the building sector barely reached 17%, and was 
significantly higher in services (56%) and manufacturing (22%). 
• The arrival of the economic crisis altered employment distribution for male 
immigrants. The decline in industrial jobs and the sharp realignment in 
building jobs displaced men toward the tertiary sector which now employs 1 
out of every 2 immigrants (51% in the third quarter of 2008). 
                                                 
54 In this section we are required to use data referring to total number of immigrants, not just those coming from 
developing or underdeveloped countries, because the quarterly EAPS does not distinguish between different 
nationalities with a sufficient degree of detail. In spite of this fact, however, the figures discussed in these sections, all 
of which are structural, do not vary significantly. 
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Table 6.  Main data on immigrant participation in the labour market - Aggregate data 
and pre- and post-recession comparison 
 
  Immigrants Natives 
Over 16 years old (1) 83%   89%   
Overall Activity Rate (1) 77%   58%   
16-24 years of age (1) 10%   5%   
25-34 years of age (1) 29%   15%   
Employed (2008) 2,942,100   17,271,700   
% immigrants / total 15%       
Employed (2009) 2,652,200   15,997,700   
% immigrants / total 14%       
Employment Rate (2008) (2) (3) 84%   87%   
Employment Rate (2009) (2) (4) 72%   84%   
  Immigrants Natives 
% By Sector (2008) (5) Males Females Males Females 
Agricultural 7% 3% 5% 3% 
Industrial 16% 6% 22% 10% 
Building  39% 1% 17% 2% 
Service Sector 39% 89% 56% 85% 
% By Sector (2009) (6)         
Agricultural 9% 3% 5% 2% 
Industrial 14% 5% 20% 9% 
Building  27% 0% 15% 2% 
Service Sector 51% 91% 61% 87% 
(1) EAPS (INE) statistical average of the first three quarters of 2009. 
(2) Percentage of active population. 
(3) Average for 2008. 
(4) Average for 2009. 
(5) Pre-recession sector weights (average for the first and second quarter 2008) 
(6) Post-recession sector weights (summer 2009) 
 
 
It is worthwhile to note in view of the previous table that immigrant presence in 
the Spanish job market is quite pronounced. It may also be argued that the distribution 
of immigrants by sector is characterized by significant differences from native 
workforce patterns, and there is a greater disparity in terms of gender for immigrants 
than for Spanish nationals. These initial sector differences would seem to underscore the 
segmented nature of the Spanish job market.  
 
This argument could not be based exclusively on the uneven distribution by 
sector of native and immigrant workers, however, there is further evidence to confirm 
this dichotomy: 
 
• According to the latest data available55, 25% of immigrant men perform 
unskilled work compared with 9% of natives. As for immigrant women, 25% 
                                                 
55 Economically Active Population Survey. Data for the third quarter of 2009. Ratio calculated from employment by 
occupation (level 9: unskilled workers). 
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are unskilled workers whereas 14% of the native female Spanish workforce 
falls into this category. 
• Only about 50% of immigrants have an open-ended work contract compared 
to 74% for natives. This consideration is extremely important as the 
temporary aspect of the employment itself suggests a significant qualitative 
decline in working conditions compared to permanent workers in Spain. 
 
But beyond de facto segmentation due to contract terms or the type of activity, 
one must also remember that the immigrant worker is actually "administratively" 
penalized because of his or her distinct administrative status: 
 
• Firstly, immigrants over 16 years may not be freely employed on demand, 
unlike natives, because they must first obtain a special work permit. Such a 
permit is granted and/or renewed under certain circumstances based on 
various restrictive conditions.  
• Secondly, the permit limits, at least in the initial years 56, the type of activity 
for which immigrants may be hired, thereby reducing the degree of 
flexibility the employee has to adapt to the job market. 
• Thirdly, work permits are temporary during the first few years, which rules 
out access to open-ended contracts, and limits even further the immigrant 
worker’s ability to adapt to changes in labour demands. 
 
Such administrative difficulties, in large part57, have resulted in an enormous 
group of employees without labour contracts. In fact58 a recent study published by 
Social Security Administration found that 56% of immigrants who said they had trouble 
finding jobs, referred to the "lack of papers" as the issue that had led to this hardship. 
 
Administrative dysfunction is clearly not the sole cause of illegal hiring 
practices: the Spanish economy, in general terms, is characterized by a sizeable 
percentage of underground employment  —the ideal "breeding ground" for over one 
million jobs for undocumented foreigners. The aforementioned study published by the 
Social Security Administration revealed that 38% of immigrants were working without 
a contract (62% in rural areas) and another study carried out in the Community of 
Madrid 59 showed a rate of 25% for that region. In any case, this means at the base of 
any estimate there are more than one million undocumented workers who give rise to an 
undeniable, de facto labour market duality. Moreover, this situation constitutes a serious 
risk not only of segmentation, but also of discrimination (segmentation outside the legal 
framework of the Workers' Statute) due to their heightened vulnerability. 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 Generally speaking, Spanish work permits granted to immigrants place limits on the type of work the immigrant 
can perform on both the first permit issued as well as on the first annual renewal. 
57 The existence of underground hiring practices extends well beyond the immigrant community, and, as such, it does 
not entirely stem from deficiencies in administrative policy regarding immigrant documentation or the granting of 
permits. Nonetheless, this circumstance undoubtedly makes it more difficult to resolve the issue. 
58 Condiciones de Trabajo de los Trabajadores Inmigrantes en España [Working Conditions for Immigrants in Spain]. 
Jose Felix Tezanos. GETS-UNED. 2007 
59 Consumption and savings habits of immigrants in the Madrid Region. Madrid Regional Ministry of Economy and 
Technological Innovation. CM. 2008. Coordinated by Ramon Mahía.UAM. 
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4.2 Contribution to economic growth 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
The basic purpose of this section is to evaluate the economic impact of 
immigrant workers, specifically those who migrated for economic reasons, on Spanish 
GDP. With regard to the outlook for the future, certain observations have also been 
made regarding the impact of the recession on this group, and potential scenarios have 
been drawn up and analyzed with respect to employment structure and native and 
immigrant job demands in coming years.  
 
During this period of intensive immigration, analysis of this phenomenon has 
attracted growing interest due to the clear, socio-economic and political consequences 
that such immigration entails. As such, a significant number of studies and analyses of 
diverse scope, depth, and degree of partiality, have been carried out by a host of 
organizations (see Izquierdo and Jimeno, 2005), in order to study this new circumstance 
affecting the Spanish economy. 
 
In this context, various contributions from a range of public and private entities 
have led to an economic impact assessment 60. It has often been reckoned that the direct 
contribution of immigrant labour, calculated based on their wages, could be considered 
to represent the estimated value of the aforementioned economic impact on the country. 
While this represents a significant part of the overall effect of the immigrant workforce 
on our labour market, there are equally important facets among the consequences of 
immigration which must be integrated into a model in order to determine the overall 
economic impact: the incorporation of work performed by immigrants must indeed have 
an impact on further hiring of native workers. Meanwhile, such work tends to have an 
impact on the structure of corporate profits in the country as well as on tax revenues. 
 
In addition to these direct effects on the national production system (increases in 
related employment, business profits and margins, and direct taxation on production and 
labour), the dynamics influencing interrelationships among various economic sectors 
have been reinforced as well (indirectly through a rise in production attributable to the 
new workforce). This is another aspect that has frequently been overlooked in the past. 
However, in our analysis, we have resolved the issue by utilizing an Input-Output 
model. 
 
Apart from this proper assessment of direct and indirect impact from the 
standpoint of production and with a view to achieving a more comprehensive analysis 
of economic impact, a third aspect must be accounted for: growth in private 
consumption derived specifically from the newly employed population of both natives 
as well as immigrants, or rather what the economic texts refer to as " the induced 
demand effect" (see Arce and Mahia, 2010 for more technical details on the full model). 
 
 
                                                 
60 Similar analyses have been carried out on several occasions, as in cases involving Madrid, 2005, Izquierdo et al, 
2007; Herrador, 2001; and Ferri et al, 2002. 
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Figure 9. Impact of induced demand and production linked to immigrant labour 
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  Source: Arce and Mahia, 2010 
 
 
At this point, it is important to define the scope of our study: 
 
• The immigrant population studied represents the so-called "economic 
immigrants" as defined earlier in this report as well as in Note 1 of the 
Technical Annex, and not those who move from countries where work and 
economic opportunities are comparable to those found in Spain (e.g. other 
countries in the EMU or the USA). Nor do we include in this study the 
economic impact of immigrants who seek retirement or recreation in Spain. 
• This analysis focuses on the economic impact of work and consumption by 
economic immigrants, without expanding the scope in this section to include 
the resulting economic impact on public expenditures. The only aspect 
considered with regard to the public sector refers to increased revenue from 
this population in terms of income tax, social benefits program contributions 
and VAT. 
 
Reliable measurement of the "economic scope" of immigration in Spain is not a 
simple task: the quantity and quality of statistical information available is less than ideal 
and, moreover, there are significant numbers of immigrants working in the underground 
economy, which leads to obvious problems when attempting to properly "account” for 
them all. 
 
With the aforementioned limitations as well as the benefits derived from the use 
of the proposed simulation scheme, effort has been made to produce a meaningful 
analysis of the basic input for our model by using the wages earned by documented and 
undocumented immigrants to develop a model which links the previously mentioned 
effects of supply and demand in order to ascertain the overall economic impact of 
immigration in Spain. 
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In the final paragraph of this section, an attempt is made to assess the future 
impact of the current recession on immigrants. Moreover, the distinct employment 
sectors relevant to them and the potential areas for job growth in coming years are 
analyzed, as well as the capacity of the immigrant population to seize these new 
opportunities. 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Assessment of the direct impact on value added from the participation of 
the immigrant labour force 
 
The first input needed to estimate overall impact is a calculation of the earnings 
paid out directly to immigrants in Spain. A simple way to estimate this figure is by 
multiplying the number of immigrants in each economic sector by the average salary 
earned. However, this step involves two factors that are difficult to measure. On one 
hand, the need to distinguish documented from undocumented employees is not an easy 
task and "unofficial" sources must be consulted. On the other hand, with respect to 
wages earned by immigrants, reliable official figures are not readily available even for 
documented workers because they are often still not adequately represented in surveys 
prepared by the INE. 
 
To get the figures that will serve as the basis for the proposed model, 
information was gathered from the Wage Structure Survey and the Quadrennial Survey 
of Salaries (both by the INE), as well as data from a Delphi conducted by the LR Klein 
Institute in 2006. 
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Table 7. Average earnings by gender, nationality and sector in 2006 (Euros per year) 
 
  All Sectors Industry Building Services 
Both Genders 
Spain 20,123.40 22,849.00 18,282.80 19,708.70 
Rest of Europe 14,101.30 14,582.50 -15,803.00 12,933.00 
Central and South America 13,811.30 15,202.80 16,070.60 12,359.70 
Africa 13,458.80 15,370.00 14,916.10 11,735.50 
Asia 12,476.00 -15,930.60 " -11,736.00 
Males 
Spain 22,720.90 24,616.90 18,567.00 23,371.70 
Rest of Europe 15,404.20 15,635.10 -15,898.10 14,697.20 
Central and South America 15,149.90 16,093.10 16,082.00 13,728.00 
Africa 14,027.50 15,674.90 14,914.50 12,395.90 
Asia -12,650.90 -17,408.80 " -11,744.40 
Females 
Spain 16,499.10 17,651.00 15,622.70 16,373.60 
Rest of Europe 11,279.60 -11,532.60 " -11,280.80 
Central and South America 11,564.30 -12,781.20 " 11,360.20 
Africa -10,346.00 " " -10,156.60 
Asia -11,659.40 " " -11,699.70 
 
Source: INE Wage Structure Survey, 2008. 
* Negative values are unreliable because they are drawn from surveys numbering from 
100 to 500 people 
 
 
From the table above, with the precautions needed to meet the data quality 
standards set by the INE itself, it may be observed that immigrant wages were, on 
average, between 30% and 45% lower than native wages with clear differences by 
gender, nationality and sector61. This data is consistent with other data gathered in the 
ILR Klein Delphi mentioned above, which contains details on contrasts between 
documented and undocumented workers: while wage differences between documented 
workers and native workers could be around 30%, the wage gap between undocumented 
workers and the native workforce could reach about 50%. 
 
As for the proportion of undocumented immigrant workers (in the shadow or 
underground economy) obviously very little precise information is readily available. 
However, certain estimations for "fiscal" purposes do indeed exist, such as those made 
periodically by the Bank of Spain referring to the overall economy (between 15% and 
25%, including the entire population), or as gathered in Tezanos (2008) as the group 
specifically targeted in this study of non-national workers were undocumented (working 
without a contract or papers in general)62. To start with, we will work with this 
hypothesis, although we will subsequently vary this percentage. 
 
                                                 
61 Although not the aim of our study, it may be briefly pointed out that these differences could be associated with 
different work characteristics between locals and immigrants. From information gathered in the Continuing Survey 
on Working Conditions 1999-2004, it can be inferred that 47.5% of the sample of immigrant workers hold a 
temporary contract with their employer, compared to 25.6% of local workers. Furthermore, 28.8% of immigrant 
workers consider their employment situation as precarious, which is higher than for local workers (16.9%). (For 
further details, see Gamero, 2009). 
62 Tezanos (2008) reached this conclusion based on a survey conducted with 2,200 immigrants throughout 2008. 
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To determine the distribution of immigrant workers by sector, information from 
the Economically Active Population Survey of the INE for the second quarter of 200963 
has been used. Analysing the micro data in this survey and an assessment of jobs 
deemed full-time or equivalent 64 produced the following results: 
 
 
Table 8. Employees by sector, nationality and gender (Number of “equivalent” 
workers) 
 
 Sex Agriculture, 
livestock and 
fishing 
Energy Industry Building Market 
Services 
Public 
Services 
EU 25 Males  1,153  2,370  2,749  6,695  4,764  -1 
Females  1,100  -1  1,603  321  19,321  148 
EU 27 Males  22,075  17,472  27,684  93,248  60,878  4,641 
Females  11,581  1,798  16,758  264  190,210  16,017 
Rest of 
Europe 
Males  3,676  3,483  4,275  11,184  14,886  1,049 
Females  1,016  223  1,772  -1  42,94  2,963 
Africa 
(except 
Morocco) 
Males  42,151  18,308  23,225  58,530  89,065  5,621 
Females  5,544  175  5,298  3,480  57,021  5,129 
Central 
America 
and 
Caribbean 
Males  2,855  4,512  3,038  11,046  28,189  3,940 
Females  741  -1  2,898  733  76,215  9,270 
South 
America 
Males  37,800  18,267  41,878  192,883  258,168  19,101 
Females  18,738  7,169  25,903  837  617,238  50,147 
Eastern 
Asia 
Males  -1  458  -1  1,549  24,587  -1 
Females  -1  -1  1,306  3,098  12,212  -1 
Western 
Asia 
Males  -1  -1  1,268  -1  -1  179 
Females  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  112 
Southern 
and South 
Eastern 
Asia 
Males  4,097  2,731  5,512  1,967  34,673  0 
Females  -1  -1  -1  -1  15,175  443 
Stateless Males  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1 
Females  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1 
Total for 
both sexes:  
   152,527  76,967  165,168  385,837  1,545,547  118,759 
 
Source: Authors’ findings on equivalent jobs drawn from EAPS data for the 2nd quarter 
of 2009. 
-1 Empty cells correspond to insufficient information. 
 
 
From this data and from the average proportions between wages and business 
profits (Gross Operating Surplus) and taxation on production data available in the 
National Accounts of Spain65, the overall direct impact of the use of labour immigrant 
on added value by sector may be estimated as follows: 
                                                 
63 Subsequently, a comparison was made between these data and the EAPS data for the second quarter of 2008 in 
order to determine certain consequences of the recession. 
64
 To estimate the number of jobs to be considered “full-time”, micro data information on real hours worked were 
used. 
65 GDP with respect to income. 
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Table 9. Contribution to National Added Value directly attributable to immigrant 
labour (Persons and proportion of national added value. Values for 2009) 
 
 Agriculture Energy Industry Building Market 
Services 
Public 
Services 
TOTAL 
Documented 
Workers 118,361 59,726 128,171 299,409 1,199,344 92,157 1,897,168 
Undocumented 
Workers 34,166 17,241 36,998 86,427 346,202 26,602 547,636 
Wages of 
Documented 
Workers (1) 1.70% 7.20% 1.90% 5.10% 3.40% 2.10% 3.30% 
Wages of 
Undocumented 
Workers 0.30% 1.10% 0.30% 0.80% 0.60% 0.30% 0.50% 
Taxation on 
Production -0.60% 1.00% 0.00% 0.10% 0.10% 0.00% 0.10% 
Business 
Gross Profit 9.70% 9.20% 1.60% 5.10% 6.20% 0.40% 4.90% 
Added Value 11.50% 20.60% 4.30% 12.50% 11.40% 3.50% 9.70% 
 
Source: Authors’ findings. 
(1) including social security 
 
 
In short, contribution to the total value added to the Spanish economy that is 
derived from immigrant labour may be directly calculated at about 9.7% of the total 
GDP. To this contribution must be added additional benefits that stem from a "chain 
reaction effect" on the general production system, from the impact of consumption by 
immigrant workers themselves, and from the emergence of new jobs for natives that 
have arisen as a result of their presence. 
 
From an inverted viewpoint, that is to say, estimating hypothetically what the 
impact might have been if immigrants had not joined the job market, and assuming that 
the rate of growth had remained the same, it can be argued that the Spanish economy 
would have created approximately one and a half million fewer native jobs. In other 
words, it is estimated that for every two jobs held by immigrants, an additional job had 
been created for a native. 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Assessment of overall impact of production and induced demand on GDP 
 
The next step of our simulation consists of evaluating the indirect impact of the 
use of immigrant labour on the business sector. This includes both the chain reaction 
effect on the rest of the production system as it is obliged to pay attention to the 
additional demand, as well as the induced demand effect to meet enhanced demand for 
nationwide consumption stemming from all of the new jobs created for both immigrants 
and natives. 
 
Applying the models of Ghosh and Leontief as mentioned in the introduction 
(for greater detail, see Arce and Mahía, 2010) the results obtained may be summarized 
as follows (see table below): 
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• The total economic contribution may be estimated at 13.2% to the GDP, 
with a particularly significant contribution from all sectors except for 
industrial and non-market services (i.e. public services).  
• The formal and casual employment of immigrants, estimated at 2,444,000 
workers, may be directly linked to the jobs of 1,624,000 natives, which 
means that for approximately every three jobs held by immigrants one 
additional job held by a native worker may have been created. 
• Logically, the aforementioned effects on employment took place throughout 
the process of integrating immigrant workers into the Spanish labour market. 
In other words, more than one and a half million new jobs for natives were 
created over the last nine years, on the basis that the beginning of the century 
marked the beginning of the immigration process. 
• Contributions to Spanish Social Security funds may be estimated at around 
7.5% of the overall 2008 Social Security revenue. Although immigrant 
workers represent nearly 15% of the total working population, their higher 
incidence of undocumented status and their lower wages explain this inferior 
percentage of contributions to the public system.  
• The VAT collected from immigrant consumption is estimated to be about 
6,100 million a year (about 3% of overall 2008 VAT revenue). Again, the 
lower wages for this group indicate that tax revenues for consumer goods 
purchased are inferior as well. 
• The effects described are based on the hypothesis that immigrant workers 
employed in the underground economy reached 22.4%. If this number were 
to be raised to 30%, the economic contribution would be approximately half 
a point less (15.5% instead of 16.4% of the base scenario). 
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Table 10.  Results of the simulation model to determine the economic impact of immigrant workers in 2009 (1) (2) 
 
  Agriculture Energy Industry Building Market services 
Non-market 
services Total 
Added Value generated (Millions of Euros)  
Value Added Directly from Immigrant Work 2,782 4,488 4,985 11,422 52,051 3,575 79,303 
Effect on Production (Ghosh) 2175 2576.5 6203.6 9574.7 47495.4 5446.1 73471.4 
Induced Demand Effect (Leontief) 872.6 908.3 3233.5 937.2 27881.8 153.8 33987.2 
Aggregate Effect (production + induced) 3047.6 3484.7 9437.2 10512 75377.2 5599.9 107458.6 
 
Added Value generated (% contribution)  
Value Added Directly from Immigrant Work 11.47% 20.63% 4.31% 12.55% 11.37% 3.46% 9.75% 
Effect on Production (Ghosh) 8.97% 11.84% 5.36% 10.52% 10.37% 5.28% 8.52% 
Induced Demand Effect (Leontief) 3.60% 4.18% 2.80% 1.03% 6.09% 0.15% 4.18% 
Aggregate Effect (production + induced) 12.57% 16.02% 8.16% 11.55% 16.46% 5.43% 13.20% 
 
Jobs created (thousands of persons)  
Jobs held by immigrants 152,527 76,967 165,168 385,837 1,545,547 118,759 2,444,805 
Effect on Production (Ghosh) 94,790 19,933 212,887 253,161 994,068 140,132 1,714,971 
Induced Demand Effect (Leontief) 38,028 7,027 110,964 24,781 583,559 3,958 768,317 
Aggregate Effect (production + induced) 132,817 26,960 323,851 277,942 1,577,628 144,090 2,483,288 
 
Source: Authors’ findings. 
(1) The IO Tables used are from 2005 (the most up-to-date available) so euro data refers to that year. 
(2) In sectors with a heavy influx of imported inputs, initial direct contribution supposes an increase in goods purchased abroad and therefore a 
reduction of national GDP. Thus, certain added value totals are lower than those directly provided by immigrants. 
  
4.3. Social integration 
The degree to which foreign-born persons become socially integrated in 
immigrant-receiving countries is a basic aspect of measuring their contribution and 
impact on the host societies. How the integration of immigrants in society is managed, 
in terms of policy, as well as how it takes place in everyday life are the most decisive 
factors in determining the success or failure of today's societies.  
 
In the light of existing data on international migration flows, three essential 
characteristics of contemporary migration patterns may be identified: 
 
• Globalization: fewer and fewer areas of the world are left untouched by 
international migration flows. 
• Diversification: current flows increasingly diverge from a single model: 
temporary and circular migration patterns coexist; the causes of migration 
are becoming more and more diverse; there is free movement as well as a 
rise in human trafficking, etc.  
• Feminization: This is a key aspect of the new global situation. 
 
Along with these three factors, the roles played by the various participants in the 
integration process should also be noted. As for developing policies to integrate 
immigrants, three key players are worthy of mention. Firstly, the importance of 
government (central, regional or local) in drafting policies meant to integrate 
immigrants should be emphasized. While in Part 2 we considered migration policies as 
a tool for managing flows and impact, when we consider integration, the local situation 
is undoubtedly the most significant. (See Graph A.1 in Annex). 
 
Nowadays, it is easy to imagine a medium size city in which one out of six 
residents is foreign-born (that is to say around 15% to 20% immigrants), whose 
population growth is due mainly to immigration (either through the arrival of new 
members, or via births of offspring with nationalities other than that of the host 
country), and where more than 100 different nationalities intermingle with different 
languages. Given this situation, it is worthwhile to devote special attention to Local 
Administrations and their integration policies. 
 
Secondly, there is the organized civil society, made up of all social institutions 
and organizations related to the area of migration (e.g. immigrant associations, social 
organizations, unions, youth clubs, etc.). In most cases, these are the ones who handle 
functions set forth in the various integration schemes. 
 
Finally, the third major player in the integration process is the population as a 
whole, consisting of both immigrants and natives who are the target of immigration 
policies and practices. 
 
 Throughout this section we aim to analyze and offer food for thought on key 
issues that will allow us to gain a better understanding of the term “integration” and, by 
comparison with circumstances across Europe, to learn about the current trends in 
establishing procedures and policies in this area. For instance: What is the true degree of 
 integration in our societies? What is the specific meaning of the notion that "immigrants 
are integrated into a particular country, region or municipality? How may this 
"integration" be measured? Who is involved? What is meant by “integration”? What 
current practices and policies exist? Integration is a complex and multifaceted concept 
involving many different factors and areas: labour, educational, social, civic, ethno-
cultural, linguistic, legal-administrative, etc. Different attempts have been made to 
measure levels of integration in societies, covering one or more areas, with an emphasis 
on one or another social factor (for instance, focusing either on immigrants or on the 
society receiving them). 
 
Two well-known, reputable sources shall be discussed: an integration index and 
an immigration survey, which focus their efforts in divergent ways. The former is 
known as the Index on Immigrant Integration Policy (MIPEX)66 and the latter is called 
the National Survey on Immigrants, by the National Statistical Institute of Spain. 
 
Firstly, MIPEX considers integration from the standpoint of the legal framework 
(the existence of legislation and/or regulations which favour or restrict the aspects 
studied) of the host societies in six different areas: access to job markets, family 
reunification, long-term residence, political participation, access to citizenship, and anti-
discrimination. The study, carried out in 28 countries (the 25 Member States of the EU 
and three non-EU countries), concluded that "the overall integration policies of the EU 
25 have been determined to be about “halfway along the road toward establishing good 
practices”. Only one country, Sweden, had managed to institute good practices in all six 
areas. Notably, Spain ranked tenth in terms of integration policies, showing its best 
performance in the area of access to job markets (second) and its weakest in political 
participation, access to citizenship, and anti-discrimination (ranked 17th in this last 
category). 
 
On the other hand, the National Survey of Immigrants, conducted in 2007 by the 
National Statistical Institute of Spain, sought to study the demographic and social 
characteristics of those born abroad, their migration routes, work and residency 
backgrounds, bonds with family and country of origin, and ties with Spanish society. 
Thus "integration" data is gathered from the viewpoint of individual immigrants 
themselves using indicators such as "the current number of mixed couples 
(Spanish/immigrant)", degree of proficiency with the Spanish language, length of 
residence in Spain, home ownership, work experience, social or interpersonal networks, 
etc. The authors go so far as to claim that "at the heart of integration is marriage and 
cohabitation (...)". This, they assert, is coupled with "a strong trend toward 
nationalization of people who either have become well established in Spain over many 
years or those who have acquired Spanish nationality, specifically through marriage or 
by having children with a Spanish partner.” 
 
As may be observed, regardless of the perspective, similar aspects are commonly 
used to assess integration, such as participation in the labour market, migratory routes, 
or family reunification processes as prerequisites for full integration. Is the fact that a 
person has chosen to reunite his or her family indicative of better integration in society? 
The concern in Europe regarding the family reunification process is not founded on 
                                                 
66 British Council, Index of Immigrant Integration Policy (MIPEX) 2007. 
 whether or not it facilitates the integration of immigrants, but, rather, on the control of 
immigration flows stemming from family reunification.67     
 
In Spain68 approximately 5% of all foreigners, or about 225,000 people, possess 
a temporary residency permit for the purpose of family reunification. Approximately 
50% of these individuals are from Latin America, followed by individuals from Africa. 
 
Undoubtedly, the existence of legislation favouring family reunification or 
political participation leads to the integration of immigrants, but, as shall be seen, one 
must delve into other complementary subjects to fully assess the degree of integration. 
For the purpose of taking this analysis a step further, it is imperative to move beyond 
mere indicators in an attempt to define and delimit the term “integration”. 
 
In 2008, the Commission of the European Communities69 stated "apart from its 
economic potential, immigration may also enrich European society in terms of cultural 
diversity. However, the potential benefits of immigration can only come about if 
integration into host societies is successfully achieved. This call for an approach that 
takes into account not only the benefits that immigration can bring to the host society, 
but the interests of the immigrants as well.” 
 
Does the integration process for immigrants take into account the interests of 
these people as well, or, on the contrary, is integration merely considered in light of its 
potential to offer benefits to host societies? In most cases, the integration practices and 
policies discussed below define integration as "bidirectional" (of immigrants and host 
societies) but in practice these "two directions" are summed up in one way: immigrants 
are the ones who must be integrated. “Integration”, in practical terms, may be 
understood to represent "the process by which immigrants become accepted in societies 
both as individuals as well as groups" (Rinus Pennix, 2003). Thus, it is undeniable that 
international immigration has led to increased diversity among societies, most of which 
were already diverse prior to receiving waves of immigrants from abroad. This 
enhanced diversity also increases the degree of complexity in managing societies, along 
with the fact that it represents an opportunity for enrichment that promotes positive 
change and transformation. 
 
What can be done to enhance the benefits of diversity and minimize the 
drawbacks? Taking advantage of diversity as an opportunity for improvement requires 
the drafting of public policies in different countries (regions or cities) to promote 
integration and equality in exercising rights, responsibilities and opportunities so that 
those from diverse, dynamic cultural backgrounds may be encouraged to live and 
interact together in terms of mutual respect. 
 
The UNESCO General Conference70, upheld this ideal by approving the 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in 
2005, which sets forth the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. It shares the 
concept of cultural diversity as a facet of development and as a guarantor of human 
dignity, which implies a "commitment to respect human rights and basic freedoms" 
(article 4 of the Universal Declaration). 
                                                 
67 Council Directive 2003/86/EC, 23 September 2003, on the right to family reunification, and the Commission 
Report to the European Parliament and the Council, 8 October 2008, regarding its enforcement. 
68 On 29 October 2009, Immigration Act 4/200 in Spain was amended, and it contains changes in this area. 
69 See communiqué number 359, 2008. 
70 UNESCO World Report "Investing in diversity and intercultural dialogue", 2009. 
  
Faced with this issue, two more questions arise: 1) what is being done in terms 
of policy?; and 2) What are the hard facts and the real practices that are truly taking 
place? 
 
Beforehand, it would be worthwhile to briefly consider the theoretical and legal 
framework involved in the integration of immigrants. Different models exist for 
managing diversity and promoting integration, depending on whether or not there are 
impediments to incorporating immigrants (Exclusion or Inclusion Models) and based on 
the positive regard and respect for differences that exist among groups that make up the 
society (Non-Pluralistic or Pluralistic Models). (See Table A.2 in Annex). 
 
Integration policies and practices are only suited to Inclusion Models, which 
promote the incorporation of immigrants in host societies. However, in light of the 
objectives sought, integration plans shall be designed for either case (plural or not). 
 
How do these “theoretical” approaches translate into practical efforts to integrate 
immigrants into host societies? Based on various factors (historical, political, 
ideological, social, etc.), nations (or regions or municipalities) implement various plans, 
programs and courses of action. Regarding the influence of these factors in preparing 
the initial theoretical model, a certain outcome will be reached depending on which way 
is chosen. This is important with respect to the overall impact and social contribution of 
immigration in different societies. If one opts for a pluralistic model that promotes the 
integration of immigrants into host societies, one must implement measures that reflect 
multicultural or intercultural principles. It is not sufficient to design politically correct 
integration plans, but, rather, ones whose measures are consistent with the model 
chosen. 
 
At this point, it is worthwhile to examine the European trends regarding 
integration, starting with a common definition of “integration” and a discussion of 
various practices in the integration of immigrants. Following this analysis, the focus 
will be shifted to Spain. 
 
In 2004, the European Council adopted the Common Basic Principles on 
integration71 and agreed on the development of various methodological tools72 to 
facilitate the coordination and exchange of information regarding the integration of 
immigrants. The aim of "promoting the integration of immigrants” is made in common 
basic principle No. 10, which states, "The policies and measures that tend to include the 
issue of integration in all relevant areas of political power, levels of government and 
public services must be duly considered when planning and implementing public 
measures”. 
 
In the 2nd European Ministerial Conference on Integration, held in Potsdam 
(Germany) in 2007, the need to develop a comprehensive and coherent integration 
policy for EU Member States was underscored. Whereas this might be considered the 
standard European framework for designing integration policies, when examining 
integration patterns of European countries a diversity of approaches may be seen, all of 
which are influenced by a multitude of factors. For example, French republicanism is 
                                                 
71 See Council of Europe on 19 November 2004. 
72 Highlights include the creation of the National Contact Points in each Member State, the Integration Manual, and 
the Integration Website.  
 leading the way towards an “assimilationist” model whose objective is to turn foreign 
immigrants into “French” citizens. At the same time, there are more multicultural 
models being used, such as those in Britain or Holland, which accept differences. 
 
 
Table 11.  Programs promoting integration of immigrants in Europe 
 
Name of Plan Objective Country 
Welcome to Birmingham 
(Bienvenido a Birmingham) 
Creation of the website: www.welcometobirmingham.org 
where newly arrived immigrants may find all types of 
information needed to integrate into British society. United Kingdom 
Allotment gardens to provide 
activity for residents and to 
promote social cohesion. 
Planting and cultivation of community vegetable gardens by 
neighbours to promote interaction and to establish common 
areas. The Netherlands 
Organizational Training for 
Immigrant Associations 
Training directed toward Immigrant Associations to reinforce 
their organization and promote improved institutional 
coordination. Germany 
French language instruction 
aimed at young immigrants 
French language instruction for young immigrants using a 
didactic and entertaining method. France 
Centre for the certification of 
professional degrees 
Occupational Centre that offers job guidance counselling 
services to immigrants based on their studies in their country 
of origin and on the job opportunities available in Sweden. Sweden 
Integration service 
Wide-ranging service with the objective of promoting 
diversity, social cohesion and active citizenship. Belgium 
Certification of doctoral 
degrees held by immigrants 
Enabling immigrants with post-graduate degrees to work in 
occupations related to their educational background. Portugal 
Equality in Health Care 
Promoting equality for ethnic minorities and immigrants with 
respect to the right of access to health care services. Greece 
Prevention program against 
female genital mutilation 
Determining strategies to prevent female genital mutilation by 
working with families and immigrant associations. Italy 
Integration Barometer 
Developing 33 assessment indicators as well as monitoring 
Danish integration policy. Denmark 
Frühstart. (Intercultural 
Education in pre-schools) 
Offering early language teaching support (in pre-schools) to 
foreign-born children. Teachers receive specialized training in 
intercultural issues to enable them to provide support from the 
outset of childhood education. Germany 
 
Source: Authors’ findings. 
 
 
As can be seen, depending on which country is involved, experiences vary 
widely, and this is closely related to the integration model employed. We shall now 
review integration practices for immigrants in Spain. 
 
To assess the policies and practices in Spain with regard to social integration of 
immigrants, it would be advisable to familiarize oneself with the Spanish constitutional 
framework and the powers granted to the various departments of administrative and 
regional government. Article 149 establishes that ‘the State has exclusive authority in 
matters of nationality, immigration, emigration, foreigner’s affairs and asylum law. 
Article 148 sets forth the diverse powers that may be assumed by the autonomous 
regions, among which are "social assistance, and health care”.’ Finally, article 150 
stipulates that "the state may, via organic law, transfer or delegate powers vested in the 
 state to the Autonomous Communities if they are, by nature, subject to transfer or 
delegation," as has been the case for education or employment. As such, integration 
policies may be set at the state, regional or local level. 
 
In this regard, a series of state wide measures exists whose main aim is to guide 
and coordinate policies. Communities must plan interventions and create integration 
models while assuming responsibility for specific areas such as healthcare or education. 
On the other hand, local authorities (municipalities, provincial councils, associations, 
etc.) must handle direct intervention in their own areas of authority, through social 
services or the promotion of civic participation. 
 
Since 1994 in Spain, when the first integration plan for immigrants was drafted, 
several different plans have successively been presented irrespective of the political 
party in power. Along with the development of these plans, one must strive to keep 
abreast of changes in legislation with respect to immigrants. The orientation of an 
integration plan is indubitably affected by ideological slants, depending on which party 
is backing it at the time. The development of an integration policy is certainly 
influenced by how the process of integration is perceived and defined. Integration 
measurements and benchmarks have been examined, taking into consideration the scope 
of authority for each level of government. 
 
In the following table, one may observe the various existing plans, the 
implementation period for each of them, and the Ministry responsible for carrying each 
of them out. In this regard, the range of ministries managing the immigration plans is 
quite significant and undoubtedly influences the focus of immigration policy—from 
regulation of immigration flows to immigration policies that place a greater emphasis 
on integration. 
 
 
Table 12. Integration plans for immigrants in Spain 
 
Name of Plan Period of Execution Ministry in Charge 
Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants 
(PISI) 1994-1996 Ministry of Social Affairs 
Global Program for the Regulation and 
Coordination of Foreigners Affairs and 
Immigration (GRECO) 2001-2004 Ministry of the Interior 
Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration 
(PECI) 2007-2010 Ministry of Work and Immigration 
 
Source: Authors’ findings. 
 
 
Also worthy of mention is the adoption of measures to integrate immigrants in 
other general plans such as National Action Plans for Social Inclusion (PNAin), drafted 
as part of the European Strategy for Social Inclusion. To date, five PNAin have been 
approved, each of which lends the issues involving the immigrant population a greater 
or lesser degree of attention. Thus, the First National Action Plan for Social Inclusion 
(2001-2003) was confined to the immigrant population at risk of or suffering social 
exclusion with measures focusing on unaccompanied immigrants and their efforts to 
join the job market. In contrast, in the Second National Action Plan for Social Inclusion 
(2003-2005) the immigrant population was already perceived as a particularly 
 vulnerable group and the elaboration of specific programs was set forth as an objective. 
In turn, the Third National Action Plan for Social Inclusion (2005-2006) aimed to 
ensure equal opportunities, combat discrimination, and promote cultural awareness and 
social participation of immigrants in line with European strategies in this area. The 
Fourth National Plan for Social Inclusion (2006-2008) stated that the objective of 
facilitating the integration of immigrants was top priority. In the Fifth National Plan for 
Social Inclusion (2008-2010) the integration of immigrants has become one of the basic 
pillars for social cohesion in order to address the negative impact that unemployment 
and the rising cost of goods and services is having on the most disadvantaged. 
 
As a complement to the elaboration of integration plans, the creation in 2008 of 
the Support Fund for the Reception and Integration of Immigrants and their 
Educational Development73t by the Ministry of Labour and Immigration deserves 
emphasis. It aims to "promote and reinforce public policies in these areas (Reception, 
Integration, and Education), based on principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and 
cooperation among the Autonomous Communities and Town Halls." The creation of this 
fund has stimulated the drafting of measures that seek to integrate Regional and 
Municipal Plans. 
 
In 2009, nearly all of the Autonomous Communities are carrying out plans to 
integrate immigrants. The table below offers a summary of them: 
 
 
Table 13. Integration plans for immigrants in the Autonomous Communities of Spain 
 
Name of Plan Period of Execution Autonomous Region 
Second Comprehensive Integration Plan 2005-2009 Andalucía 
Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2005-2008 Generalitat Catalana 
Integration Plan 2009-2012 Madrid 
Galician Plan for Citizenship, peaceful coexistence and integration  2008-2011 Galicia 
Plan for the social inclusion of immigrants in the community of Murcia 2006-2009 Murcia 
Second Basque Plan on Immigration  2007-2009 País Vasco 
Second Plan for the social inclusion of immigrants in Extremadura 2008-2011 Extremadura 
Master plan on inclusion and peaceful coexistence 2008-2011 Generalitat Valenciana 
Second Comprehensive Immigration Plan 2009-2012 La Rioja 
Second Comprehensive Plan for intercultural coexistence in Aragon 2008-2011 Aragon 
Comprehensive Immigration Plan 2005-2009 Castilla y León 
Second Plan for Social Inclusion 2008-2011 Castilla-La Mancha 
Second Comprehensive Plan for Immigrant Services 2004-2007 Baleares Islands 
Second Immigration Plan of the Canary Islands 2006-2008 Canary Islands 
1Plan for Social Inclusion of the Immigrant Population 2002-2006 Navarra 
 
Source: Authors’ findings. 
 
 
                                                 
73 Resolution of 19 February 2008 (B.O.E. [Official State Gazette] of 29-02-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 Whether or not an Immigrant Integration Plan is in place is not prerequisite to 
being able to measure the scope of integration policies and practices. It is necessary, 
however, to thoroughly assess the concept of integration that is being promoted and the 
measures that are being adopted to develop it. 
 
On a nationwide scale, within the framework of the Strategic Plan for 
Citizenship and Integration of Ministry of Labour and Immigration, integration is seen 
as a"two-way process of mutual adaptation that requires the active participation of all 
citizens, immigrants and natives, as well as the host country's institutions, and aims to 
achieve an inclusive society that guarantees the full economic, social, cultural and 
political integration of immigrants based on the principles of equality and equal 
opportunity. Integration is a continuous and dynamic process that gradually takes 
place, in different stages and facets, over the short, medium and long term. Integration 
is two-way because it affects immigrants and host society’s individual citizens and 
institutions. And this bi-directionality supposes the acknowledgement by both parties of 
their rights and duties. Integration represents a mutual adjustment process between 
those who are citizens by birth and those who settle in Spain and become new citizens 
by residence. In this two-way process of mutual adaptation everyone must respect the 
basic values prevalent in Spain and in the European Union. (PECI, 2007-2010) 
 
This definition of integration implies that changes and reforms must be made in 
the host society to achieve bi-directionality. A clear example of efforts made in this 
regard may be found in Education, one of the twelve areas of assistance set forth in the 
PECI (see table A.3 in the Annex). For instance, the measures toward the "preservation 
of languages and cultures of origin: Measure 10.1. Advancement toward signing 
agreements with the countries of origin of the immigrant population to elaborate plans 
for the preservation of languages and cultures. Measure 10.2. Promotion of efforts 
associated with immigrant students’ languages and cultures of origin that target 
students themselves or the educational community as a whole. Measure 10.3. Promotion 
of academic certification for knowledge of vehicular language of the immigrant 
student’s countries of origin”. 
 
The aforementioned model of regional and administrative organization may lead 
to definitions of integration processes that are dissimilar and even contradictory. If one 
continues to pursue an analysis of the concept of integration and the measures adopted 
to promote it in regional and municipal plans on immigration, a vast disparity in criteria 
becomes apparent. The existing definitions of integration are diverse: 
 
• Inclusion Plan of the Community of Madrid (2009-2012): "it is worthwhile 
to organize integration by taking into account several levels: the first is 
related to problems of language and education, and employment and social 
protection, to which must be added security and respect for the law. Without 
addressing these basic issues, integration is not possible. (...)Again, it is 
worthwhile to note that integration into the host society or "with" it (because 
integration is to a certain extent reciprocal) does not represent a repudiation 
of the culture of origin—and mixing or alternating practices and behaviour 
from both cultures is common. This may or may not be done in a "positive" 
way, because it may or may not be "destructive" (and determining what is 
"positive" and what is "destructive” becomes problematic.) Any integration 
process deals with individual freedoms. The immigrant is a free person, not 
merely a member of a particular community or ethnic group. A society 
 divided into separate ethnic groups or communities represents a political 
regression: a return to the concepts of the Old Regime (different rights and 
status according to social or national origin) (...).We should bring into play 
the idea of gradual integration. We realize that the real situation for 
immigrants is not uniform and varies widely, for example, depending on the 
time spent in Spain. Gradual progression toward citizenship is a response to 
this heterogeneity. These stages do not imply by any means a distinction 
between immigrants by category. Quite the contrary, it indicates the 
beginning of a dynamic, a virtuous circle, to push and motivate the 
immigrant towards greater integration, and toward a greater awareness and 
participation in his or her surroundings. Clearly what should not be at stake 
in this gradual process are the basic, inalienable and universal rights, or the 
safeguards and enforcement of the law, also universal and equal for all. What 
is sought is not to penalize marginalization, but, rather, to encourage 
integration and participation." 
• Plan for Social Inclusion and Intercultural Coexistence of Zaragoza (2006-
2009): (...) this integration should be understood as a process to put new 
members of Zaragoza society on an equal footing with the rest of the native 
population, leading to changes both in the newly arrived population, as in the 
receiving one. Thus, our proposal for social inclusion and intercultural 
harmony is focused on the "they" and the "us", taking into account that we 
are all heterogeneous from a cultural and personal point of view. In this 
context, we must avoid adopting general, simplistic attitudes toward 
homogeneity (there is no single group of immigrants, but, rather, many 
different groups in terms of origin, culture, beliefs, family circumstances, 
occupations, legal status, languages, etc.) or excessively particularistic, 
"cultural" or "ethnic" positions that make immigrants feel as though the are 
not part of a collective citizenry." 
 
As can be observed, the different approaches taken on immigrant integration 
issues from the perspective of different integration plans (national, regional or local) 
influence the measures and actions adopted to achieve their objectives, which has a 
profound impact on social benefits for host societies. Although, as stated at the 
beginning of this section, most tasks associated with the integration process fall to 
immigrants. 
 
In tables A.4 and A.5 of the Annex, one may compare different areas of 
intervention and measures adopted under three regional plans as well as in others 
carried out by the largest Spanish cities. 
 
Virtually all of the regional plans analyzed are involved in one or more of the 
following areas: refugee reception, employment and training, health, housing, 
awareness, women and youth, mainstreaming and coordination. On the other hand, a 
few of them deal with Participation and Co-Development. 
 
Additionally, upon examination of local plans, measures adopted include the 
following: the establishment of “observatories”, the use of studies, mediation and 
translation services, legal assistance, awareness in the fight against discrimination, 
association building measures (subsidies), and the forming of interactive organizations 
(forums). A few plans address issues such as civil servant training at local government 
 offices, whereas none of them contemplate any actions against discrimination and 
racism beyond raising awareness. 
 
The current trend is to foster the development of specific integration programs 
for new immigrants, with an emphasis on learning the language of the host society, so-
called “welcome programs”, orientation courses, etc. In the case of Spain, but also in 
other European Union countries, integration policies have focused heavily on actions 
aimed at improving access to local resources and shelter, or, what amounts to the same 
thing, a short-term focus on integration. Little attention has been dedicated toward 
medium and long-term measures that might have an impact on future integration 
processes. In other words, once an immigrant has held an initial residency and work 
permit over a reasonably steady period, they are deemed "integrated into their host 
societies." Generally speaking, adequate measures and actions needed to ensure their 
true integration are currently lacking, as seen above, such as bolstering work 
advancement, streamlining access to political rights, avoiding discriminatory situations, 
and so on. 
 
The vast majority of integration plans and practices should seek to strengthen the 
concept of two-way integration previously discussed, and establish benchmarks, 
principles and effective measures to promote real change in host societies. The rules of 
the game must be changed in such areas as citizen participation, the fight against 
discrimination, equal opportunity, training and youth-oriented educational measures, 
and intercultural dialogue (i.e. a two-way conversation involving at least two groups: 
immigrants and host societies). 
 
All such questions should be addressed even more urgently during an economic 
crisis characterized by rising unemployment among immigrants, many of whom are 
long-term residents in the host societies. Palliative measures have been adopted, such as 
the procedure for voluntary return74, for example, for immigrants who opt for the 
Advance Payment of Unemployment Benefits to Immigrants Program (APRE). The 
number of immigrants participating in this program speaks for itself: In June 2009, a 
total of 1,800 requests had been made, the same amount as for 2008, which seems to 
underscore the limited scope of this type of proposals that, if they are indeed needed, 
must always go hand in hand with plans and proposals that aim to integrate immigrants 
in effective and sustainable ways. 
 
Two main conclusions may be drawn from this analysis: 
 
• The integration of immigrants is a priority issue for host societies, even 
though it is closely associated with different control and management 
policies for migration flows. 
• Plans, Programs and Actions geared toward various facets of integration are 
being developed based on different models for managing diversity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
74Royal Decree 1800/2008 of 3 November regarding the implementation of Royal Decree-Law 4/2008 of 19 
September, which dealt with the voluntary return of migrants under the auspices of the APRE program. 
 4.4 The impact of the recession on the economic contribution of immigrants 
 
With the new circumstances brought on by the recession, the economic 
landscape for immigrants is likely to change dramatically over the coming years.  The 
issue to be worked out in the coming years is how Spain can be put back on a path of 
growth that leads to the creation of jobs. In any case, intense growth that is heavily 
based on the building sector and on low-skilled labour-intensive sectors clearly does not 
seem to offer the most promising way forward. In the medium term, restructuring the 
production base could lead to a job market more akin to those of our nearest competitors 
and with similar production capacity depending upon current levels of development and 
infrastructure. In the more distant future, perhaps the only way to achieve adequate 
growth in job demand is by investing in technology-oriented companies, thereby 
preventing the off-shoring of production due to lower labour costs. 
 
What will the role of foreign workers be in this new general economic and 
specific labour market scenario?  Before approaching an overview as complex as the 
one attempted in this section, certain basic questions should be considered beforehand: 
 
• How has the current recession affected the immigrant worker population?  
• By how much has the rate of entry of immigrants decreased, and how likely 
are they to return to their country of origin?  
• How much have GDP contributions by immigrants fallen during the first 
year and a half of the recession?  
• What short-term effect has this had on public revenues (VAT, social service 
contributions and income tax)?  
• Which sectors will lead Spanish economic growth in coming years and what 
possibilities exist that will enable immigrants to find new jobs?  
• In the medium and long term, what will Spanish economic growth and what 
kind of jobs will be created as a result? 
 
Currently, it is possible to speak of a significant rise in the number of 
unemployed workers among the immigrant population. Based on EAPS micro-data and 
contrasting the values of the second quarter of 2009 with those for 2008, one may 
observe that while 36.4% of immigrants stated that they were unemployed a year ago 
during the week studied, in the second quarter of this year the percentage rose to 46%. 
The EAPS unemployment rate has grown from 16.8% in 2008 to 28.8% in the current 
year. 
 
Underlying these 12 percentage points of difference, of course, is both the 
number of redundancies (about 5.5%) as well as the rise in the immigrant active 
population (6.5% for the same period). If data for the last quarter of 2009 is taken into 
account, after a full year of recession the situation would seem to have deteriorated still 
further, with a net destruction of immigrant jobs because workforce growth would have 
noticeably declined (there was an increase of about 80,000 people comparing the third 
quarter of this year with that of last year). 
 
 Given the low average seniority of jobs held by immigrants (just 1.7 years 
according to data from the 2006 Wage Structure Survey by the INE) and reductions due 
to lack of official documentation for this group of newly unemployed workers (as well 
as their relatively low wages), the impact on unemployment benefit expenditures may 
be considered minimal and short term (entitlement to these benefits expires quickly). 
Regarding indirect taxation, once again the short-term impact is relatively slight (one 
must remember that VAT revenues derived from the overall immigration process 
represent 3% of the total, so the impact stemming from relatively short-term job losses 
among this population may be considered minimal as well). 
 
Following the same macroeconomic impact simulation scheme used in this 
research, the effect of the recession on the economic impact of immigration may be 
estimated as a reduction by just over one percentage point of their contribution to the 
overall Spanish GDP (dropping from 14.5% in 2008 to 13.2% in 2009). Clearly, most of 
this loss is concentrated in services and building. These two sectors have been hit the 
hardest by the recession, and they contained a heavy concentration of jobs held by 
immigrants.  
 
The key question in light of this issue over the coming months and years is how 
to reemploy this existing group of individuals whose numbers continue to show a 
growth trend as new workers arrive (although this is likely to be much less pronounced 
than in the past). In this context, two important questions arise: 1) which sectors will 
drive growth in the Spanish economy and, thus, lead to the greatest demand for jobs?; 
and 2) what possibilities exist so that immigrants currently performing low-skilled work 
may be retrained for other occupations?  
 
In every possible way, it seems obvious that the period in recent years during 
which the building sector has served as a main driving force for Spanish GDP is coming 
to a close (albeit later than originally forecasted), but continuing in this way into the 
future would have become unsustainable. As for the rest of Europe, this sector should 
become less significant in coming years, giving way to other sectors such as high value-
added industry and skilled services, because traditional Spanish sectors may have 
reached a level of semi-saturation (tourism) or decline (textile and shoes 
manufacturing). 
 
Over the next 2-3 years, less activity in building will produce a rise in the 
relative importance of other sectors, even if they do not necessarily experience a boost 
in their own levels of activity. If this was to be the case, this could simply lead to a 
scenario in which a surplus of workers in certain sectors would not even be able to gain 
access to other sectors where the demand for jobs is also flat (moreover, all of this 
supposes that the transition from one sector to another was simple and did not need a 
retraining process that might temporarily delay or even permanently prevent it from 
taking place). 
 
Over the medium term, i.e. over the next decade, it may be projected that, on the 
one hand, the Spanish economy could again re-establish rates of growth that could 
approach those of other countries in our surrounding economic environment in terms of 
characteristics as well as proximity in production methods. This situation must coexist 
with the progressive appearance of companies with greater long-term growth potential 
that would feed long-term economic growth (perhaps over the next thirty years) 
characterized by a prevalence of high-tech, highly-productive industries that are 
 internationally competitive, less labour-intensive, and less vulnerable to possible off-
shoring to countries with lower labour costs. 
 
With a host of nuances, perhaps an outline similar to that of our closest EU 
neighbours might help to partially define the structure of sectoral weight toward which 
convergence could lead in the short term. In this context, and to ascertain which 
potential scenarios for economic growth exist for future years, a comparative study can 
be carried out on similarities and differences between EU countries and Spain with 
respect to the characteristics of the sectors underpinning such growth. For this purpose, 
a statistical cluster analysis has been proposed to identify such similarities between 
patterns of sectoral growth with our closest neighbours in terms of geography and 
commerce. We begin by analyzing the historical impact on the GDP of each of the 
production sectors in Europe. The methodological strategy consists of performing a 
cluster analysis with two objectives: 
 
• To identify groups to which each country belongs as per similarities 
observed in their sectoral weight over the last five years; 
• To determine the values of sectoral weight that characterizes each of these 
groups (the centroids for each group). 
 
The results of this analysis allow for the following grouping as per similarities 
observed 75: 
 
 
Table 14. Statistical Cluster Analysis: Country groups by sectoral similarities. 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Belgium Bulgaria Estonia Greece  
Denmark Czech Rep.  Ireland Cyprus 
Germany Lithuania Spain Latvia 
France Poland Italy  
Holland Romania Hungary  
Sweden Slovakia Malta  
UK Croatia Austria  
Finland Estonia Portugal  
 
Source: Authors’ findings. 
 
 
In short, those in the first group represent most developed EU countries; in the 
second group are most of the Eastern European countries that have recently joined the 
EU; in the third are somewhat more diverse economies; and lastly, the fourth group 
consists of three countries that defy comparison with the rest. 
 
In order to determine the “average weighted values” for each sector in the group 
in question (the third), we used a calculation of the centroids for this group, with the 
following results: 
 
                                                 
75 For cluster studies, the Ward method was used with analyses of chi-square counts, all of which was applied to the 
data set resulting from the weights of the value added by each sector on the national GDP. To determine centroids, a 
weighted average of sector-specific weights of the components of Group 3 was calculated from the inverse of the 
agglomeration coefficients obtained via the Ward method, prioritizing the closest correlations in the group over the 
most distant. 
  
Table 15. Estimation of sectoral weight on GDP in Spain on the 2020 planning horizon 
 
Country Agriculture Industry Building 
Commercial 
Services, 
Transport, 
Communications76 
Business and 
Financial 
Services77 
Other 
Services78 
Estonia  3.8 22 6.9 28.1 22.7 16.5 
Ireland  2.3 28 8.9 17.6 25.6 17.6 
Spain  3.6 18.7 10.7 25.4 20.9 20.7 
Italy  2.4 21.5 5.8 23.3 26.5 20.6 
Hungary  4.5 25.2 4.9 21 21.5 22.9 
Malta  2.7 19.3 4 28.8 19.9 25.3 
Austria  1.9 22.8 7.1 24.2 23.2 20.9 
Portugal  3.1 18.5 7.1 24.4 21.3 25.8 
Centroid 2.81 22.96 7.05 25.06 24.72 22.33 
Std. Deviation 0.82 3.32 2.15 3.23 2.31 2.66 
Distance Centroid - 
Spain -0.8 4.3 -3.6 -0.4 3.8 1.6 
 
Source: Authors’ findings based on Eurostat data. 
 
 
The methodological approach chosen provides a baseline scenario for the future 
(5-10 years) with regard to sectoral weights in Spain, characterized by a significant 
decline in the building sector (3.6 point drop) to be replaced by a marked increase in 
weight for industry (up 4.3 points than at present) and in the area of financial and 
business services (3.8 points), and slight adjustments in other sectors (agriculture and 
other services). The transfer, on the one hand, has occurred from building to industry, 
but there has also been a shift from lower value services to those of higher added value 
(to companies, financial and other non-commercial firms), which represents a growth 
model with greater potential for improvements in work productivity. 
 
If this is the case, it would be possible to achieve a higher degree of growth in 
overall added value, but one that would be much less consumptive regarding labour (at 
least unskilled). In this sense, it is conceivable that the trend over the last decade to 
resort to "imported" labour force (i.e. immigration) should experience a sharp decline. 
 
The scenarios discussed so far have a potential weakness: the group that contains 
Spain seems to be, in theoretical terms, very heterogeneous even though statistics show 
that they are the most similar in terms of their economic structures (sectoral weights). In 
this light, a second assessment of a production system in comparison with the rest of the 
EU might be worthwhile, taking into account only euro-zone countries, and, again, 
calculating the centroids of their sectoral weights 
 
In short, rather than starting with making up a group of "similar members", a full 
group has been formed using the twelve euro-zone countries. The results obtained in 
this case are the following: 
                                                 
76 Wholesale and retail trade, vehicle repair, personal and household goods, hotels, restaurants, transport, storage and 
communications. 
77 Financial services, real estate, renting and business activities. 
78 Public administration and defence, social security, education, health and social work, personal assistance, and 
households that employ domestic services. 
  
 
Table 16. Centroid for a full group of the twelve euro-zone countries 
 Agriculture Industry Building 
Commercial Services, 
Transport, 
Communications 
Business and 
Financial Services Other Services 
Centroid 1.69 19.5 5.55 22.53 27.39 23.36 
Deviation 1.13 4.07 1.67 3.54 3.82 2.41 
Distance 
Centroid – Spain -1.87 0.81 -5.13 -2.88 6.44 2.63 
 
Source: Authors’ findings. 
 
 
In this second approach, the building sector and low value-added services 
continue to represent those with the largest drop in contribution to GDP. The difference 
from the previous scenario centres on the fact that the increase in weight for the 
industrial sector is much more limited (less than one point), and growth in the business 
services and finance sector increases considerably (by more than six points). 
 
Of course, one must not overlook the phenomenon of increasing average age as 
a decisive factor in a society such as Spain’s. Apart from the fall in birth rates, longer 
life spans and improved "quality of life" give rise to a boom and steady growth potential 
in services sought by the elderly. The importance of these activities will undoubtedly 
continue to grow in the coming years. 
 
Based on historical weights registered in the Spanish economy, before and after 
the increase, these percentages would be in the range of 16% to 20% with respect to 
industry, 6.5% to 11% in building and 46% to 47% for commercial services. With these 
figures in mind, the scenario showing a return to similar weights to those reflected by 
the centroids of EMU countries seems quite reasonable. 
 
Raising the planning horizon to more than twenty or thirty years, the growth 
outlook should be focused on "a comparison with the best" as the most desirable 
objective, and the most successful companies with the greatest growth potential will 
likely aim to reach the one set for the current inner core EMU countries. This process 
will indeed be lengthy and gains in terms of macroeconomic sectoral weight may 
become protracted in time. Yet, in the immediate future, the green shoots of these types 
of high-end, long term businesses should begin to sprout and eventually grow to take 
the lead in driving future growth79. 
 
Outlined in this way for the different periods considered, one may foresee a 
Spanish labour market which will lose jobs for at least another year. Afterwards, growth 
in the medium term will be prevalent in sectors that, are generally consumptive and 
offer fewer jobs, and, which also require a more highly skilled workforce. Considering 
the longer term, job demand may recover in terms of the degree to which newly created 
companies are called upon to lead growth in the future. In any case, changes in 
employment such as those experienced in recent years seem to be unlikely to be 
repeated in the future. 
                                                 
79 The case of Japan’s development after World War II (a country with few natural resources and limited territory in 
terms of its population size) is an example of the possibility of reorganizing a production system to drive powerful 
national economic growth for many years based on cutting-edge technology. 
  
Focusing specifically on the potential impact this new situation may have on 
immigrants, one clearly must analyze certain circumstances: the capability of moving 
workers from one sector to another (with or without retraining), trends projecting the 
influx of immigrants in coming years, and the likelihood that immigrants will return to 
their country of origin or simply move on to another destination country.  
 
Regarding the first point, it is conceivable that workers with higher levels of 
education will be better equipped to switch from one sector to another. It is worthwhile 
to note on this subject that immigrant workers generally have a higher level of 
education, including a higher percentage with secondary-school studies when compared 
to the Spanish population in the same circumstances). As for the areas where a 
reduction in workforce is clearly forecasted (building and services in the segment of 
unskilled workers), it has been observed that the educational levels for immigrant 
workers tend to be higher than for the natives (one may surmise that they are 
overqualified for the work they perform). The case is similar, although much more 
pronounced, with unskilled jobs. 
 
 
 Table 17. Occupation and educational level for natives and immigrants (Percentage by 
educational level for each occupation) 
  Nationality Spanish Immigrant 
Administrative workers Elementary 23.70% 21.60% 
Secondary School 36.80% 41.30% 
University 39.30% 37.10% 
Post graduate 0.20% 0.00% 
Restaurant, personal or protective 
services workers, and salespersons 
Elementary 48.80% 40.30% 
Secondary School 32.70% 43.30% 
University 18.30% 15.40% 
Post graduate 0.20% 1.00% 
Skilled workers in the agriculture and 
fishing industries 
Elementary 76.20% 50.40% 
Secondary School 14.40% 30.90% 
University 8.40% 14.00% 
Post graduate 1.00% 4.70% 
Craftsmen and skilled tradesmen in 
the manufacturing, building, and 
mining industries 
Elementary 65.40% 45.70% 
Secondary School 18.10% 38.20% 
University 16.40% 14.90% 
Post graduate 0.10% 1.20% 
Installation and machinery operators 
and assemblers 
Elementary 66.70% 42.30% 
Secondary School 20.90% 42.30% 
University 12.20% 14.90% 
Post graduate 0.20% 0.50% 
Unskilled workers Elementary 77.70% 51.60% 
Secondary School 14.90% 34.10% 
University 6.60% 11.80% 
Post graduate 0.80% 2.50% 
Total Elementary 57.10% 45.10% 
Secondary School 24.60% 38.30% 
University 17.90% 15.00% 
Post graduate 0.30% 1.60% 
 
Source: INE Wage Structure Survey, 2008. 
 
 
What has been seen with respect to skills may be subject to certain 
considerations regarding the equivalency of the training received in other countries or 
the weight of unofficial training received merely through work experience80. Even in 
view of these considerations, the table above would be consistent with positive selection 
theory postulated by Borjas and with the broad consensus among researchers. People 
who choose to emigrate generally tend to be the most skilled, and, furthermore, they 
have already shown that they are able to adapt to other societies, different labour 
markets, distinct occupations, and so on. In short, and a priori, immigrants tend to be 
more willing to make the "jump" from one occupation to another. 
 
                                                 
80 More detail on this argument may be consulted in the CES (2009) document, edited by Ramon Mahía. 
 In any case, and in spite of this, we must stress once again that the growth 
pattern characterizing the Spanish economy, which to date has been very labour 
intensive and has thus led to a strong demand for both native and immigrant workers, is 
going to change. 
 
In this new framework, the benefits that have attracted a large influx of 
immigrants will decline considerably, and, presumably, so too will the numbers of those 
seeking to immigrate. In the economic publications on the importance of various factors 
that drive migration flows, the consensus seems to be that "pull factors" (as opposed to 
"push") are more relevant when choosing a destination country. That is, the chances of 
finding work and of improving quality of life in the destination country (logically) 
influence the final decision to emigrate81. In short, the pressure of an influx of 
immigration on the job market is expected to dissipate dramatically. 
 
The analysis of potential repatriation, even with a limited scope, also draws 
particular interest to this subject. Although the government plan to offer incentives for 
immigrants who return to their country of origin has attracted very few takers among 
the immigrant population to date, these numbers may not be so scant in coming years82.   
 
Measuring the likelihood of repatriation for the immigrant population is a 
particularly difficult task because of the many motivating factors that can affect the 
decision-making process, and also due to a lack of reliable statistical data on those who 
eventually do move back or move on to a new “host” country. Of course, the statistics 
of the destination country may be more or less stringent while the immigrant population 
remains in the country, but there is virtually a complete loss of data the moment a 
person leaves the country. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a variable that may be used to measure, at least in 
approximate terms, the intention of immigrants to return to their country of origin, and 
we can concurrently assess the factors involved when there is a greater or lesser degree 
of willingness to take this decision. From the survey on immigration issued by the INE 
in 2008 (with 2007 data), responses to the question, "Do you intend to return to your 
country over the next five years?" may be used as a variable that provides the desired 
data, although these results should obviously be used with caution because of the many 
possible permutations that exist in the correlation between this variable (potential) and 
the actual decision to return. 
 
Performing a Cox regression to determine the probability of return as per the 
number of years living in the country while taking into account a broad range of factors 
that could have an impact on that likelihood83, the following "risk of return curve" was 
obtained according to the number of years passed since first moving to the host country. 
  
 
                                                 
81 Immigrant admission requirement issues may be consulted in Arce y Mahía (2009). 
82 In November 2009 figures, only around 8,700 immigrants have benefited from the voluntary return plan promoted 
by the government. 
83 Employed as conditioning variables to estimate this likelihood were the following: sex, nationality, whether 
remittances were sent regularly, whether the country of origin was visited during the migratory period in Spain, 
whether or not the migrant owns his or her home in Spain, whether or not the migrant is employed, whether contact 
with the family in the country of origin is maintained, whether or not the family has been reunited, educational level, 
and a survey question asking if he or she feels comfortable living in Spain. 
 Figure 10.  Probability of return curve in terms of number of years of residence 
 
 
Source: Authors’ findings. 
 
 
Thus, generally speaking, the decision to return is taken by a maximum of 20% 
of the immigrant population after approximately ten years living in the host country, 
with a much lower incidence during the first five years. 
 
As may be expected, this study was able to confirm statistically whether or not 
being unemployed might indeed be a factor that would increase an immigrant’s 
likelihood to return. Other variables may also increase the probability of return, such as 
whether visits had been made to the country of origin or whether remittances had been 
sent. On the other hand, other variables reduce this likelihood (if other family members 
had been reunified with the immigrant in Spain, whether or not they own their own 
homes, whether they have their residency documents in order, or if they first moved to 
the host country at a young age). A clearly decisive factor influencing these variables 
was the immigrant’s place of origin.  
 
Immigrants from Asia (about 6% of all immigrants), show the greatest 
reluctance to return. For a bit longer than the first five years of residence, few 
differences arise with respect to the likelihood of returning per place of origin. 
However, from about the seventh year, a higher propensity to return becomes manifest 
among citizens of other non developed European countries (in this period just over 50% 
of them appear willing to return) and Latin Americans (just over one third). As for 
citizens of Africa, the likelihood remains under 10% until at least the first twelve years 
of residence. 
 
Undoubtedly underlying these distinctions are both the economic and social 
conditions in the country of origin left behind as well as future prospects for potentially 
returning to settle there once again under better conditions and with a greater capacity to 
employ gains acquired through emigration (savings, work experience, training—if 
received—, etc.). 
 
  
Figure 11. Probability of return curve in terms of years of residence (Detail for areas of 
origin) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ findings. 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Migration Policy Challenges: new requirements for the new environment  
 
The present labour situation and the short-term forecasts show an extremely 
pronounced unemployment rate which could exceed 20% in 2010. According to the 
ECB, the sustainability of recovery will be precarious. In the absence of marked 
reforms, a new model based on innovation and economic dynamics and a sustainable 
growth cannot be achieved when the workforce is one of the least dynamic elements in 
the system.  
 
If this suggestion is taken into account, the question remains as to the role that 
immigrants residing in Spain will play in this new model, especially if the objective of 
attracting and facilitating the insertion of more qualified foreigners would be 
satisfactorily completed. 
 
Although the change in the production model should have been undertaken years 
ago, considering the present economic situation and the need for reform, in fact, it is a 
suitable moment to elaborate strategies for the future hiring of qualified immigrants.  It 
is not feasible to expect them to arrive from other EU receiving countries because they 
are also in need of highly skilled workers. 
 
With respect to this question, the first step should be to assess the real 
necessities of the labour market. It is important to offer very attractive conditions to 
 highly skilled immigrants if they are to settle in Spain. An example which is considered 
in the newly adopted law is inspired by the restrictive policies promoted by most 
European immigration receiving countries, including a recent receiver such as Italy. 
However, one of the characteristics of this policy includes the assumption that selected 
immigration is an undesirable option from the point of view of the sending countries 
(principally developing countries) because it accelerates brain drain as well as cultural, 
economic and technological impoverishment in highly qualified immigrants’ countries 
of origin. 
 
Taking into account the forecast for migration flows and the inevitable 
forthcoming period of economic recovery, as well as considering the trend of 
immigration policies of other Member States, Spanish immigration policy will become 
more restrictive, something that can be already perceived in the current legal reform.   
Therefore, further large regularization processes should no longer be used going 
forward as their results are questionable and regularization should instead occur on a 
case-by-case basis84.  
 
On the other hand, immigrants arriving have the intention to settle in Spain and 
we could predict that the main source of immigrant increase in the next years will be 
due to family reunifications which cannot be obstructed as a result of rights legislation. 
It is here that policy implementation could run into serious difficulties, resting as it does 
on one of the four pillars of EU migration policy. Therefore, one of the main tasks of 
immigration policy going forward will be related to addressing the integration of 
immigrants who already reside in Spain and their family reunifications.   
 
Since family reunifications are important sources of foreign population increase 
in traditional receivers such as Belgium, Germany, the UK or France, new receiving 
South European countries (such as Spain) can expect a similar future experience. As has 
been the case in those countries, an increase in the number of nationalizations will occur 
as the stock of immigrants in Spain is already very high and have been accumulating 
years of residence. France, for instance, was the only traditional receiver which 
encouraged permanent immigration, although lately a tightening of new entries and an 
increase in deportations is taking place. An increase in the number of family 
reunifications  can be expected as a result of growing networks between immigrants 
already settled in Spain and potential migrants still in their countries of origin.  
 
In this respect, we can suggest that a large increase will come from third country 
foreigners. In the last few years, relevant increases proceeding from the latest EU 
members’ nationals has been observed.  In fact, Romanian nationals have become the 
main immigration group, although as the economic situation in their own countries 
improves, one could expect a large number to return, just as Spanish emigrants returned 
in the past, precisely because migration was labour related. 
 
According to the EU approach to managing economic migration, “in order to 
decide when there is a need to recruit third-country nationals, very strict and more 
flexible conditions must be set out. Whatever system or systems are approved by the 
EU, they must be able to fill specific jobs and to meet recognized short-term and long-
term workforce market requirements”. It would be supposed, given the experience 
gained, that further documented entries will be conditioned by the economic situation 
                                                 
84 In accordance with the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum.  
 and the reception capacity of the country involved, as well as immigrant unemployment 
trends.  
 
It is envisaged that after the adoption of the new law, the Government will 
approve a plan on border control with an increase in the number of policemen dedicated 
to border protection designed to progressively implement the EU Integrated External 
Vigilance System.  This would require border security policy planning in accordance 
with FRONTEX. More resources will also be allocated to an increase in deportations. In 
conjunction with this measure, mass media coverage could be considered to inform the 
population about deportations to the same extent that it is currently informed about 
undocumented entries. This could have an indirect effect on potential migrants’ 
decisions. 
 
Meanwhile, given the growth of the young population in many third countries, 
the economic and social differences as well as the political instability, it is unlikely that 
migratory pressure will fall noticeably in the near future even taking into account that 
the current economic crisis could check the intensity of new entries. However, 
considering the demographic forecasts referred to in another section, the impact of 
ageing cannot be averted without a significant increase in fertility and/or future intense 
migration influxes. In fact, as the already settled immigrant population is not large 
enough to compensate for the ageing process in Spain, making further influxes 
necessary to satisfy future workforce market necessities. According to the EC 
Communication on immigration, integration and employment, “maintaining the 
working-age population, and even more so maintaining old-age dependency ratio, 
would require massive increases in immigration until 2030. A major limitation of such 
an increase in economic terms would be the fact that the immigrant population is also 
ageing, in line with the indigenous demographic patterns”. Therefore, any "immigration 
boom" over the next decades would, under the same assumptions, result in a similar 
situation as witnessed today but at a later point in time. From a social cohesion 
perspective, any massive increase in immigration would also increase the challenge of 
integration to a much larger extent” (EC, 2003). 
 
The reinforcement and formalising of dialogue with immigrant organizations 
and other organizations which deal with migration issues including the most 
representative Trade Union and Employer Organizations, as well as encouraging active 
participation, could enhance both the creation and development of migration policy and 
issues relating to integration. Taking into account again the intense and recent growth of 
immigration in Spain, it is necessary to urgently design and implement efficient 
programmes in order to achieve the sustainable integration of people already settled in 
Spain as well as those who will arrive in the near future. Considering the economic 
nature of immigration in Spain, the first step of integration is insertion into the 
workforce. As we could see in the previous section, there is a prominent presence of 
immigrant workers in the secondary job market. Although the average education level 
of the immigrants in Spain is slightly lower than that of the native population, it is 
commonplace to employ foreigners with higher education in positions that do not match 
their qualifications. In the elaboration of integration plans and programs, the 
government should consider elaborating on reinsertion programs aimed at employing 
these people, as much as possible, in positions which are more suited to their education 
and previous professional background. There is already a wealth of experience around 
 immigration 85 and that, along with EU trends, could lead us to enacting a policy that is 
much more efficient in reaching objectives. 
 
 
 
4.5 Milestones toward social integration  
Several different programs, plans, actions and measures toward social 
integration of immigrants have been seen. But how does the choice of a model affect 
integration? What future challenges exist with respect to integration? As previously 
shown, immigration is not merely a circumstance that temporarily affects modern 
societies, but, rather, it is an integral part of them. Immigrants are going to continue 
to live, work, study, etc. in different countries, regions and cities. When drafting 
integration policies one must take into account not only those who come from 
abroad, but also the society as a whole--including those who come through an 
immigration project, those seeking reunification with their families, those who were 
born in the host societies, and so on. 
 
It is important to reflect on two key factors in order to make real progress 
through integration programs and plans. Firstly, cultural diversity in societies must be 
promoted, and, secondly, social cohesion and intercultural harmony must be fostered. 
 
The ability of a city to constantly attract and retain immigrants from abroad 
involves a process of political thought and action that is considered to be a key aspect of 
a city’s success86. It is true that today this trend is centred on being able to attract skilled 
immigrants87, although persuasive and comprehensive arguments are often needed to 
defend diversity. 
 
Sometimes countries develop "peculiar" strategies to encourage diversity in their 
societies. This is the case, for example, in the United States with its Diversity Visa 
Program. Each year the U.S. government raises the number of visas granted—50,000 
for 2011—targeting those whose nationalities are underrepresented in the U.S.88.  
 
Why is cultural diversity enriching? Why should a neighbourhood with over 
fifty nationalities be preferable to one with just a single nationality? Cultural diversity 
enriches communities in two ways. Firstly, it offers more alternatives, because diversity 
revitalizes a society in continuous flux and transformation thereby reducing social, 
economic and cultural stagnation and stimulating permanent qualitative growth. 
Secondly, cultural diversity allows each individual to establish an identity in a 
multicultural society that offers a huge variety of options to choose from, ranging from 
merely folklore or gastronomy to a myriad of artistic and cultural expressions. 
 
Clearly, diversity is a driving force for change and positive transformation as it 
involves the need to develop public policies that promote inclusion and equality with 
regard to all obligations, rights and opportunities. The main objective of such policies 
                                                 
85 As well as following the example of practices carried out in other much more experienced EU states. 
86 See Opencities project of the British Council. 
87 For more information see the "blue card" of the European Union, or legislative changes in European Union 
countries (e.g. the Netherlands) 
88 For more information see: http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1322.html 
 should be to ensure peaceful interaction and voluntary co-existence among persons 
belonging to a wide and dynamic variety of cultural backgrounds. 
 
It is very important that all those who live in a country, region or city should feel 
as though they are able to participate, and that the place where they have chosen to live, 
work, and study is suited to them. Such transformations of a place occur on behalf of all 
of its residents and demand not only this spirit and mentality, but also the very policies 
needed to adequately address them.  
 
Social cohesion is understood to represent the degree of consensus among the 
members of a social group in the perception of belonging to a common project or 
situation. It is a measure of the degree of intensity of social interaction within the group. 
On the other hand, intercultural harmony is "the interaction between two or more 
identities who, discovering and acknowledging each other reciprocally as sentient 
beings, attempt to become complementary for one another as opposed to becoming 
antagonistic, and begin to search for common ground for the future" (Duccoli, 2001). 
 
Europe has taken on 34% of the world’s migrants from 1990 to 2005. Spain, in 
particular, has received more than 4 million immigrants over the same period. This was 
an economic boom period and the arrival of immigrants to meet labour market demands 
was understandable. The research studies took into account contributions made by these 
workers to Social Security, thus underscoring the positive impact of immigration. 
 
In early 2009, immigrants still account for around 15% to 20% of most 
European regions (particularly in European capitals) and at the same time the number of 
unemployed immigrants has risen sharply. 
 
Most immigrants choose not to return to their countries. Positive immigration 
flows towards Europe continue, even though many jobs have been lost and the 
arguments based on economic criteria during boom times tend to become inverted in a 
recession. Immigrants’ economic contributions turn into costs, payouts for 
unemployment benefits, mortgage defaults, etc. 
 
At this point it is more urgent than ever to state and reiterate the benefits of 
diversity, as described above, and to pursue policies that promote social cohesion as an 
alternative for both the present as well as the future. 
 
To sum up, in case the aforementioned arguments leave any doubt, it is 
worthwhile to make one more: social cohesion is the cheapest option for societies. In 
addition to the social benefits of peaceful coexistence that have been described in depth 
above, one may add the social and economic costs of conflict. What is the cost to a 
country or city of racism or gender violence? An enlightening study was conducted in 
Guatemala, which estimated that losses due to discrimination and racism represent 3% 
of GDP ($855 million each year). This research resulted in the drafting and 
implementation of a National Plan for Combating Racism and Discrimination in 
Guatemala. 
  
 
 
 
5. The Effectiveness of Laws: How Much Does Policy Matter? 
 
Having looked at flows, policies and the impact of immigration, it is clear that a 
key analytical challenge for academics and policy makers alike relates to the relationship 
between these three phenomena.  Above all, it is crucial to be able to assess the capacity 
of policy measures to influence migration outcomes?  Or put differently, to what extent 
are policy differences responsible for the variation in migratory flows such as those 
presented in Figure 12.   
 
 
Figure 12.  Average Number of Asylum Applications 
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Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks. Data-range: 1985-2000 
 
 
When looking at the relationship between migration flows and policies, it is 
reasonable to assume that, other things being equal, restrictive policy measures will 
make it more difficult (or less attractive) for immigrants to come and hence decrease 
immigration flows to that country.   
 
However, there are at least two fundamental problems one encounters when 
trying to assess the impact of polices on migration flows.  First, even if a causal 
relationship between particular policy measures and particular outcomes can be 
established, to determine what specific policy measures in a wider set of policies are 
responsible for the observed effect is very challenging.  Without disaggregated, 
comparative policy data, it will very hard to isolate the effects of particular policy 
measures.  Second, the ‘ceteris paribus’ (or ‘other things being equal’) assumption 
usually does not hold when comparing situations before and after the introduction of a 
particular policy.   
  
There are currently few comparative datasets that provide the kind of data with 
which one could analyse the impact of specific policy measures while controlling for 
other immigration push and pull factors.  It seems reasonable to assume that the lack of 
such data will have lead to researchers using less reliable research designs and 
potentially erroneous conclusions as the impact of policy changes.  The following case 
study on European asylum policy in the 1990s will be used to illustrate this further.   
 
Asylum policy is one of the few areas of migration policy where researchers 
have collected some comparative and disaggregated policy data.  In the following, we 
will show how these datasets can be created, how they can be extended to include other 
areas of migration and what new research opportunities are opened up by doing so.   
 
In addition to their humanitarian objectives, the role of national asylum policies 
is to restrict the inflow into a particular country to an acceptable number.  This means 
that policy makers will try to use migration policy instruments to make sure that their 
country will not be seen as a ‘soft touch’ or as an overly attractive destination country 
that will attract an unacceptable number of asylum seekers. Three sets of such 
instruments in particular are at their disposal: access control; the determination process; 
and migrant integration policy. Access control policy refers to the rules and procedures 
governing the admission of foreign nationals and its instruments including visa policy, 
regulations for carriers, safe third-country provisions, etc.89 Rules concerning 
determination  procedures relate to entry into a country’s refugee recognition system,  
appeal rights, and rules concerning protection that is subsidiary to the  rather narrowly 
defined Geneva Convention criteria for full refugee status.90 Finally, integration policy 
is concerned with rights and benefits given to asylum seekers inside a country of 
destination (e.g., work and housing conditions, rules on freedom of movement, welfare 
provisions, educational opportunities, etc.). Policy-makers might want to introduce 
restrictive policy measures in these three areas in an attempt to raise the deterrence 
effect of their policy, which in turn is expected to make their country less attractive to 
asylum seekers in relative terms.  Recent research (Thielemann 2004, 2006; Hatton 
2004) has developed a way to generate datasets of comparative, disaggregated policy 
measures that allow researchers to analyse the relative importance and effectiveness of 
deterrence policy measures.  Thielemann generates a policy deterrence index (see 
Figure 13) for 20 OECD countries over a fifteen year period.  The index ranges between 
0 (most liberal/open) to 5 (most restrictive).  
 
 
                                                 
89 “Safe third country” provisions mean that asylum seekers are denied access to the refugee status determination 
procedure on the grounds that they could or should have requested  and, if qualified, would actually have been 
granted asylum in another country. In practice  this means that asylum seekers who have travelled through other 
countries before reaching  their destination will not have their asylum application examined in the country of their  
choice, but will be returned to the other country (Hailbronner 1993; Kjaergaard 1994). 
90 According to the Geneva Convention, a refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the 
country of their nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection 
of that country. 
 Figure 13. Asylum Policy Deterrence (Restrictiveness) Index  
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Source: OECD SOPEMI Yearbooks and Yearbooks by the US Committee for Refugees 
 
 
To calculate the index, Thielemann analyzed key developments in those 
countries’ national asylum policies.  The dataset identifies five measures in particular 
that stand out as they  have been widely regarded  by policy makers as having the 
potential to significantly influence an  asylum seeker’s decision as to which country to 
apply to (United Kingdom  Home Office 2002).91 First, in the area of access control, 
arguably the most  important measure was the introduction of so called ‘safe third 
country’  provisions, which mean that persons seeking asylum will be refused entry  
into a country, if on their way to this country they travelled though another  state which 
the first country regards as safe, and in which the asylum seeker could have applied for 
asylum. If an asylum seeker’s travel route only transpires in the course of the 
determination procedure, he or she can be sent back to the ‘safe third country’. The 
introduction of ‘safe third country provisions’ meant that asylum seekers travelling 
‘overland’  to Europe were no longer able to legitimately claim asylum in the country  
of their destination, as the responsibility for their case was shifted onto a  neighbouring 
country through which they had travelled. To account for the  introduction of safe third 
country provisions, a dummy variable is created which takes the value 1 for each year 
that safe third country provisions  were applied in a country and the value 0 for all other 
years.  Second, with respect to a country’s determination procedures, the most  
important potential pull factors that can be influenced by national policymakers  are the 
rules concerning the granting of subsidiary protection  status which allows an asylum 
seeker to remain in a country of destination  even though their application for full 
refugee status under the Geneva Convention is refused. Destination countries have 
complete discretion  in defining the requirements that protection seekers have to fulfil to 
be awarded such subsidiary status, which means that within Europe, the  percentage of 
asylum seekers allowed to stay in a country on the basis of the award of some protection 
status varies from single figures to over 70 percent (UNHCR 1999). Again, a dummy 
                                                 
91 Other relevant indicators such as a countries’ detention and deportation rates, their visa requirements, and their 
readmission agreements with third countries have not yet been included in the index for lack of comparative data. 
However, these measure are expected to positively correlate with the other indicators used here and their omission is 
therefore not expected to significantly distort the results. 
 variable is created which takes the value 1 if a country of destination is below the 
average with regard to the percentage of asylum seekers it allows to stay in its country 
in a particular year, and which takes the value 0 if the percentage of protection seekers 
allowed to stay is above the OECD average.  Finally, much of the discussion over the 
past few years has focused on the potential pull-effects entailed in a third category of 
asylum policy,  namely that of integration measures for asylum seekers. Here three 
policy aspects are often regarded as being crucial: first, freedom of movement versus a 
compulsory dispersal policy; second, cash welfare payments versus a system of 
vouchers; and third, the right to work under certain conditions  versus a general 
prohibition to take up employment as an asylum seeker. The first of these concerns is 
the right of asylum seekers to move freely within their country of destination until their 
asylum claim has been determined. While a federal state such as Germany has always 
had central reception centres from which asylum seekers are to be dispersed  to the 
different Lander according to their relative population size, some  unitary states – most 
notably the UK – have recently introduced similar  measures. Although dispersal 
measures first and foremost are an attempt to alleviate pressures from particular (usually 
metropolitan) areas which are faced with a strong concentration of asylum seekers, such 
measures are also hoped to deter unfounded asylum claims. Second, the ‘cash’ payment 
of welfare benefits rather than a payment ‘in kind’ or through a voucher system has 
sometimes been regarded as a pull-factor for asylum seekers.92 This has led a number of 
OECD countries to stop giving asylum seekers cash benefits and to replace cash 
payments by the direct provision of housing, food and health care. In 1999, the UK and 
Ireland introduced a voucher system for asylum seekers, despite the fact that the two 
governments were advised that such a system would be more costly to administer than a 
cash-based system.93 However, governments have been attracted to vouchers due to the 
deterrent effect that has sometimes been ascribed to such non-cash schemes. Finally, 
allowing asylum seekers to work while their claim to asylum status is being assessed 
has also sometimes been regarded as a potential pull factor for asylum seekers.  All 
countries of destination have work restrictions for asylum seekers in  place. However, a 
number of countries have gone further and now prohibit  asylum seekers from 
undertaking any work until their asylum claim  has been accepted.  To assess the 
potential deterrence effect of the above measures, three dummy variables were created 
which take the value 1 (for each year and country) for the existence of a dispersal 
scheme, a non-cash based system  of benefits, and a law which prohibits asylum seekers 
from work until their claim has been accepted. Adding all the dummy variables for all 
five of  the above potential deterrence measures for each country and each year, results 
in a country’s deterrence index for a particular year summarised in  Figure 13 above for 
Germany, France, the UK, Spain and the EU as a whole.94  The expectation is that the 
higher the index for a particular country in a particular year, the lower that country’s 
relative attractiveness will be, and hence its relative burden stemming from asylum 
applications. 
 
Through this comparative measurement of disaggregated policy measures and a 
multivariate statistical research design, it can indeed be shown that the combined effects 
of deterrence measures, presented in the deterrence index, has lead to a relative 
                                                 
92 The British government, for example, resisted pressure to abolish the UK’s voucher scheme. Government advisors 
warned that “re-introducing cash benefits would create a pull factor for thousands more asylum seekers” (“Details of 
Blunkett’s asylum shake up”, The Guardian, February 7 2002). 
93 In the light of strong protests by human rights NGOs and rising costs, the UK abandoned its voucher scheme and 
reintroduced the previous cash-based system only a few years later.   
94 To create the aggregated index, it was initially assumed that each of the five policy measures have the same 
potential deterrence effect, an assumption that was later relaxed when looking at the effect of individual measures. 
 reduction in the number of asylum applications.  However, the effect of policy-related 
factors is not as strong as often assumed and weaker than that of historic network 
factors and general economic conditions. Moreover, if one disaggregates the measures 
included in the deterrence index (see Table 18), one finds that the index’s restrictive 
effect is mainly due to the role of two of the five measures analyzed here. These two 
are: (1) not allowing asylum seekers to work until their application has been successful 
or until they have been allowed to stay in the host country more permanently on the 
basis of a subsidiary protection status; and (2) granting protection status to a smaller 
percentage of asylum seekers (in relation to the total number of applications) than other 
host states.   
 
 
Table 18.  Impact of Specific Restrictive Policy Measures 
 
Deterrence Measure Impact 
Prohibition to Work High 
Below Average Recognition Rate High 
Safe Third Country Provisions Low 
No Freedom of Movement (Dispersal) Low 
Non-Cash Benefit Payments (Vouchers) Low 
 
 
There are a number of plausible reasons why it might not be greatly surprising 
that individual deterrence measures will be overshadowed by these other pull factors. 
Most importantly, ties through friends, family or other networks are likely to be very 
influential, even in the face of a country’s not-so-welcoming asylum regime. Moreover, 
path-dependent processes can be expected to play strong roles because of the sunk costs 
involved in the creation of forced migration networks. Restrictive immigration control 
policies create a profitable niche for those exploiting the black market of international 
migration. Organized trafficking gangs and individual ‘entrepreneurs’ provide a range 
of services to migrants for which they are able to charge often extortionate fees.95 
Networks between these traffickers, agents, potential migrants and legal residents or 
citizens of destination countries are costly to build and are unlikely to be given up 
lightly. Finally, a country’s reputation as a liberal, open and fair society can be expected 
to evolve over decades, if not centuries, and is unlikely to be undermined overnight by 
the introduction of a particular set of restrictive asylum measures. Third, as states tend 
to copy deterrence measures introduced by other states, the desired impact of such 
attempts by one state to make its asylum policy more restrictive relative to other 
potential host countries, is often limited to a very short-term first mover advantage. The 
rapid spread of ‘safe third country’ provisions across Europe in the 1990s (Thielemann 
2004), is perhaps the most prominent recent example of such processes of cross-country 
policy transfer that have become very common in this area. Finally, the effectiveness of 
unilateral policy measures can be expected to be further undermined by multilateral 
efforts of international policy harmonization (Thielemann 2004). Given the structural 
character of many of the pull factors identified above, we can expect attempts to 
harmonize asylum law across receiving countries to consolidate, rather than effectively 
address, existing disparities in the distribution of asylum burdens. By curtailing states’ 
abilities to use differentiated policy tools to counteract the effects of country-specific 
                                                 
95 According to IOM figures, fees for services such as the smuggling across borders, arranging forged documents and 
visas, organizing employment and lodging range from several hundred to over $30, 000 US Dollars depending on 
which country of origin and which host country are involved. It is estimated that more than 70 percent of asylum 
seekers make use of such services. 
 
 structural pull factors, policy harmonization initiatives, such as those currently 
developed by the EU (Thielemann 2003), can further limit the capacity of states to 
effectively regulate asylum flows.   
 
The results of this case study therefore suggests that some of the most prominent 
public policy  measures aimed at regulating unwanted migration flows are less effective 
than has often been assumed. The analysis has shown that the most powerful 
explanatory factors for migrants’ (and asylum seekers’) choice of host country are only 
partly due to differences in policy, but more importantly due to legacies of migrant 
networks and relative employment opportunities in host countries.  This means that 
asylum destination choice is affected above all by ‘structural’ factors that, at least in the 
short and medium term, are beyond  the reach of asylum policy makers.    
 
The comparative compilation of disaggregated policy data therefore allows 
researchers and policy-makers to draw conclusions that were beyond the scope of earlier 
policy research.  The results of the research example discussed above, opens up the 
prospect of a highly promising future agenda for migration research that is likely to 
provide invaluable new insights for academics and policy makers alike. 
 
 
 
6. Looking Ahead: An Agenda for Immigration Policy Research 
 
Immigration is an often divisive and hotly contested political issue in most 
developed countries. It is seen by some as an economic lifeline for ageing western 
economies, but there are also widespread concerns about the potential strains imposed 
by immigration on local labour markets, welfare, public health, education systems, etc..  
We suggested above, that a key issue for governments in all migrant-receiving states is 
whether and to what extent laws and policy actually affect migration patterns. Does 
policy matter and if so, how much? 
 
Governments adopt a wide variety of approaches to regulating immigration. 
They give different meanings to basic concepts such as citizenship and residency, and 
place different importance on skills, family ties, or cultural and ethnic diversity when 
selecting immigrants. But it is impossible at the moment to say much more than that 
about alternative approaches to immigration policy. There are no comprehensive, cross-
nationally comparable data on immigration policies and no systematic method for 
classifying, measuring, and comparing immigration policies across countries and over 
time. 
 
The International Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) Project, a 
collaborative research undertaking initiated by the LSE Migration Studies Unit, Harvard 
University, the University of Sydney, the University of Amsterdam and the University 
of Luxembourg, aims to address this void.  Its goal is to devise a system for measuring 
and evaluating the operation of national immigration laws, policies and practices against 
contextualised statistical data and outcomes.  The Project aims to devise a common 
standard or coding system that will facilitate the evaluation and comparison of 
immigration law and policy both across nations and through time within individual 
states.   
 
 This report provides an important stepping stone for this wider research 
ambition.  By taking stock of our existing knowledge and its current boundaries, 
highlighted with the case of Spain, a country that has undergone a unique 
transformation in migration flows and policies, this report directly feeds into this future 
comparative migration research agenda.  The following will briefly set out this agenda 
and show how this report can provide a valuable base for future studies.   
 
In the past, scholars conducting comparative analysis of immigration policies 
have relied almost exclusively upon qualitative evidence for small samples of countries. 
Watts (2002) evaluates evidence of the restrictiveness of immigration policy in a number 
of dimensions (legalization, quotas, family reunification and work permits) for Spain 
and Italy from 1980 to 1999, for France from 1945-1999, and for the United States in 
the 1990s. Brochman and Hammar (1999) compile a set of detailed case studies of 
immigration control in Europe in the 1990s, but they do not attempt to quantify these 
policies for comparison, and focus instead on the potential obstacles to harmonization of 
immigration policy among EU member states. Meyers (2004) compiled an extensive list 
of immigration laws in the United States, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, but 
does not compare them in terms of their restrictiveness and notes that there are large 
variations in the ways that laws are interpreted and implemented by government 
agencies.  
 
In terms of its measurement focused analysis, the IMPALA Project builds upon 
the work of scholars in a variety of disciplines who have developed cross-national 
measures of immigration policies that are (however) very limited in scope.  Timmer and 
Williamson (1996, 1998) developed a quantitative index of immigration policy change, 
which measures the changes in the general restrictiveness of immigration policy along a 
ten point scale. This measure was only assessed for the period between 1860 and 1930 
and for only six countries: the United States, Britain, Argentina, Brazil, Canada and 
Australia. 
 
Other scholars have attempted to evaluate immigration policies using immigrant 
inflow data. For instance, Money (1999) measures immigration policy as annual per 
capita immigrant inflows for twelve immigrant-receiving countries, from 1962 to 1989. 
Kogan (2007) constructs a measure of the “relative selectivity” of immigration policy 
for 15 European Union countries from 1992-2000 by examining the difference between 
the proportion of immigrants with tertiary education and the tertiary educated native 
born. But using immigrant inflows to evaluate immigration policy is extremely 
problematic, as inflows are determined by the applicant pool (the supply of potential 
immigrants from sender countries) and not simply the immigration policies of the 
receiving country.  Many other factors can be involved: see (Castles 2004a, 2000b; 
Neumayer 2004; Thielemann 2006). 
 
Other scholars have created specific comparative measures of asylum policies.  
This report has already outlined one of these approaches (Thielemann 2004, 2006) in 
the previous section.  Hatton (2004) developed an alternative index of the “Toughness” 
of asylum policies for 14 European Union member states between 1980-1999, 
calculated from coding restrictions on access, procedures, outcomes of asylum decisions 
and the treatment of asylum seekers.  However, these studies only focus on one specific 
aspect of policy responses to international migration and they rely on a relatively small 
number of indicators to capture policy differences among states.  Such an approach has 
 its weakness when one seeks to broaden the comparison beyond fairly similar EU 
Member States. 
 
Recent efforts among European Union Member States to harmonize their 
approaches to immigration policy have motivated some new comparative research on 
current policies in place in Europe. Sponsored by the European Union and its partner 
organizations, this research has focused most notably on citizenship and naturalization 
policies. A prominent study produced by Bauböck et al. (2006a; 2006b) applies a 
typology created by Harald Waldrauch that identifies 27 modes of “acquisition of 
nationality” and 15 modes of “loss of nationality.” Utilizing this typology Bauböck et 
al. have sketched a qualitative comparison of 15 EU countries between 1985-2004.  The 
study makes no attempt to provide quantitative measures of immigration policies, 
however, or to quantify the modes of acquisition and loss of nationality.  
 
Other EU-sponsored research that has focused on European harmonization 
includes the work by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group, which 
produced the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (see Niessen et al. 2007), to 
which this report already referred to earlier.  The MIPEX is a quantitative measure of 
over 100 policy indicators across six policy areas including labour market access, 
family reunion, long-term residence, political participation, access to nationality, and 
anti-discrimination laws.  The 2007 MIPEX, which covers 25 EU Member States and 3 
non-EU countries, updates the 2004 European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index 
(produced by the British Council, the Migration Policy Group, and the Foreign Policy 
Centre and the University of Sheffield), which covered only the 15 EU States. No 
attempt has been made to produce the index for years prior to 2004.  Both the 2004 and 
2007 versions of MIPEX apply a normative framework measuring country policies 
along a three point scale according to how well a country has met a pre-determined EU-
standard in that policy area.  Coding is performed by two country experts. This research 
seems to represent the first substantial attempt to provide comparative, quantitative 
measures of immigration policies across EU Member States. Unfortunately, the 
normative criteria used to create the index, and the limited coverage of countries and 
years, limits suitability of the index for academic research. 
 
The IMPALA research team is currently gathering comparable data on 
immigration law and policy in five pilot countries, before the scheduled extension of 
this data collection effort to 25 countries of immigration between 1960 and 2010.  
Based on the research for this report, the IMPALA team now plans to include Spain as a 
pilot country in the first phase of the project.  The initial coding of laws and collection 
of corresponding outcome data in the pilot countries will ultimately be used to fine-tune 
the methodological approach for the empirical analysis of other OECD countries before 
moving on to the study of key non-OECD countries in a third phase of the project. 
 
All major categories of immigration law and policy are examined: economic 
migration, family reunification, permanent immigration, temporary migration, asylum 
and refugee protection, policies relating to undocumented migration, border control and 
the acquisition of citizenship. Also examined are policies relating to the integration of 
immigrants into the host country, including government programs providing medical 
insurance, cash benefits, housing assistance, employment assistance, job skill and 
language training, and civics courses. 
 
 In terms of methodology, the IMPALA Project will use coders familiar with 
national policy regimes, who will analyse national legislation and policy documents for 
each country, tracing statutes and regulations over time to identify the laws and policies 
in effect in each year. Research using primary text legislation will be facilitated by the 
use of the leading annotated texts and electronic resources used by legal scholars and 
professionals for each country.96 Additional documentary sources will include 
government department and agency publications, international conventions, regional 
and bilateral agreements, and reports from international organizations. Immigration 
laws and policies in each country will be coded independently by at least two different 
individual coders, with any discrepancies highlighted and resolved by the project team.  
Practice and context will be addressed by both review of relevant reports and other 
publications and through consultation with national experts. 
 
Within each category of migration policy, the various types of statutes and 
regulations that affect the numbers and types of immigrants that can enter a country will 
be identified, as will the conditions under which those immigrants can enter, reside, 
work and become naturalised.  These statutes, regulations and policies will be coded for 
each country annually to enable comparisons, for instance, between rules for family 
reunification; requirements for attaining citizenship; criteria relating to threshold issues 
such as health and character; limits on the mobility of temporary workers; quotas for 
refugees; detention practices regarding asylum seekers, undocumented arrivals and 
overstayers; and sanctions on employers for hiring illegal immigrants. In many cases the 
codes will indicate the presence or absence of a specific type of restriction (e.g., 
whether asylum seekers are placed in detention while their applications are decided); in 
other cases, the codes will reflect quantitative measures (e.g., the financial penalties 
imposed on employers found to have hired undocumented immigrants).  Parallel data 
will be coded and analysed on the statistical data available in each category so as to 
capture both outputs on the one hand and outcomes on the other.  These will be related 
both temporally (by year) and thematically using the coding categories.  
 
Previous research has not provided comprehensive, cross-nationally comparable 
data on immigration policies or any systematic method for classifying and measuring 
the regulations and restrictions imposed in different countries and at different moments 
in time. This imposes severe constraints on policy makers who are expected to develop 
effective responses to the challenges that international migration poses.   
 
By creating a comprehensive, cross-nationally comparable dataset on 
immigration laws, policies and practices - contextualised by the parallel collection of 
statistical and other outcomes - the project will enable scholars and policy makers to 
evaluate the effects of different approaches to managing immigration, which is hoped to 
make a critical contribution to ongoing debates and policy decisions.  
 
The envisaged IMPALA dataset should be of great value to researchers in a wide 
variety of academic disciplines. It will be useful to economists interested in explaining 
immigration flows and their economic effects, to sociologists examining the social and 
cultural consequences of immigration, to political scientists interested in explaining 
immigration policies and the political impact of immigration, and to legal scholars 
studying the rights granted to immigrants and refugees in different countries.  
 
                                                 
96 For instance, much of the preliminary coding of U.S. immigration laws and policies has been accomplished by the 
use of the Westlaw online database. 
 With better cross-national policy data, scholars in a variety of fields will be able 
to address core theoretical questions about the determinants and consequences of 
immigration policies, some of which this report has been able to highlight.  However, 
this report has also shown that it is extremely difficult to engage in meaningful 
comparative analysis with the kind of datasets that are currently available to academics 
and policy makers. Lacking detailed and comparative quantitative data on actual 
policies, past research has tended to focus on the examination of qualitative policy data, 
restricted to a comparison of a small number of cases. This report, like the envisaged 
IMPALA dataset (by providing precise and comprehensive quantitative evidence on 
policies across countries and across time periods) will ultimately allow for more in-
depth comparisons and consequently the more effective testing of established theoretical 
claims and the developing of new hypotheses about the determinants and impact of 
international migration.  The aim of this report was to bring the international research 
community a step closer to the realisation of this ambition. 
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TECHNICAL ANNEX 
 
Note 1:  
 
Brief comment on the main resources used to measure the stock of immigrants. 
 
Municipal registry figures on residence may not accurately reflect the actual size 
of the immigrant population for several reasons. On one hand, residency certification, 
although required for access to basic public services, is not mandatory. This could mean 
that a certain number of immigrants may never have been listed in the records. On the 
other hand, the records may continue to describe as “residents” a certain number of 
immigrants who may have left the country long ago, even though immigrants are 
required to renew their residency status every two years since 2004. 
 
An alternative source of data available when attempting to estimate the size of 
the immigrant population is the State Secretary of Immigration and Emigration (the 
SEIE), belonging to the Ministry of Labour and Immigration. This organization 
regularly publishes statistics on immigrants with registry certificates or valid residency 
permits. Obtaining a registry certificate or a permit allowing some sort of residency 
and/or work is prerequisite to holding residency in Spain. Clearly, the figures from the 
Ministry are, as is the case for the municipal registries, somewhat biased in that the 
statistics fail to take into account what are commonly referred to as "undocumented" 
immigrants. 
 
Note 2:  
 
Definition of “economic immigrants” 
 
Those considered to be economic immigrants come from one of the following 
countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania (European countries with EU membership); 
Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia (Ex-
Yugoslavia), Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine (Non-EU European countries), 
all African countries, all American countries except the USA and Canada, all Asian 
countries except Japan, and all citizens of Oceania except Australia and New Zealand. 
 
Thus, the countries that have been excluded are the following: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom (European countries with 
EU membership); Andorra, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland (Non-EU 
European countries); United States and Canada (the Americas); Japan (Asia); and 
Australia and New Zealand (Oceania).
 ANNEX OF TABLES AND GRAPHS 
 
Table A.1: Comparison between the officially documented resident immigrant 
population and the estimated volume and percentage of unofficial or undocumented 
cases 1998 -2009. 
 
(1) Municipal Registry figures 
as of 1 January for each year 
(2) SEIE figures as of 31 
December of the 
previous year 
(3)=(1)-(2) Undocumented 
Immigrants 
(3)/(1) % of 
Undocumented Cases 
1999 748,954 719,647 29,307 4% 
2000 923,879 801,329 122,550 13% 
2001 1,370,657 895,720 474,937 35% 
2002 1,977,946 1,109,060 868,886 44% 
2003 2,664,168 1,324,001 1,340,167 50% 
2004 3,034,326 1,647,011 1,387,315 46% 
2005 3,730,610 1,977,291 1,753,319 47% 
2006 4,144,166 2,738,932 1,405,234 34% 
2007 4,519,554 3,021,808 1,497,746 33% 
2008 5,268,762 3,979,014 1,289,748 24% 
2009 5,598,691 4,473,499 1,125,192 20% 
 
Source: Authors’ findings based on data from the Statistical Use of the Municipal 
Register (INE) and from the Immigrants with Registry Certificates or valid Residency 
Permits (Secretary of State for Immigration and Emigration). 
 
 
Table A.2: Immigrant residents broken down by Autonomous Community. Figures and 
percentages given for the total population  
 
 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
POPULATION 
% IMMIGRANTS 
of TOTAL POPULATION 
COMMUNITY 
Locals 
Economic 
Immigrants 
Total 
Economic 
Immigrants 
ANDALUSIA 18,6% 10,1% 8,8% 5,8% 
ARAGON 2,9% 3,6% 14,5% 13,5% 
ASTURIAS 2,5% 0,9% 4,5% 3,8% 
BALEARIC ISLANDS 2,1% 3,2% 27,7% 16,2% 
CANARY ISLANDS 4,4% 3,4% 16,6% 8,3% 
CANTABRIA 1,3% 0,8% 6,9% 6,0% 
CASTILE AND LEON 5,8% 3,3% 6,9% 5,9% 
CASTILE-LA MANCHA 4,5% 4,9% 12,1% 11,6% 
CATALONIA 15,3% 22,9% 18,8% 15,9% 
COMMUNITY OF VALENCIA 10,2% 13,3% 21,0% 13,8% 
EXTREMADURA 2,6% 0,7% 3,4% 2,7% 
GALICIA 6,5% 1,7% 3,9% 2,8% 
MADRID 12,9% 21,6% 19,6% 17,7% 
MURCIA 2,9% 4,5% 19,4% 16,3% 
NAVARRA 1,4% 1,4% 12,5% 10,8% 
BASQUE COUNTRY 5,0% 2,6% 6,5% 5,5% 
RIOJA 0,7% 0,9% 16,9% 14,7% 
 
Source: Authors’ findings based on provisional data as of 1 January 2008 from the 
Statistical Use of the Municipal Register (INE). 
 
 
 Graph A.1: Cities with 100,000 or more foreign-born residents 
 
 
 
Source: Migration Policy Institute. 
 
 
Table A.3: Strategic areas of the PECI (2007-2010) 
 
Reception 
Education 
Employment 
Housing 
Social Services 
Healthcare 
Childhood and Youth 
Equal Treatment 
Women 
Participation 
Awareness 
Co-development 
  
Source: PECI and authors’ findings. 
 
 
 Table A.4: Comparison of Regional Integration Plans for Immigrants 
 
Integration Plan of the Community of 
Madrid (2009-2012) 
Plan for social integration of immigrant 
persons in the region of Murcia  (2006-
2009) 
Galician plan for Citizenship, 
Coexistence and Integration  (2008-
2011) 
Welcome and Reception Social Services Area Reception 
Social Services Education and Culture Area Legal Services and Safeguards 
Employment and Job Training Healthcare Area Social Services 
Housing Housing Area Healthcare 
Education Employment and Training Area Housing 
Healthcare Cooperation and European Networks Area Education 
Communication and Awareness Coordination Area Social-employment 
Work for Peaceful Coexistence  Civic Participation 
Participation and Culture  Co-development 
Women, Family, and Youth  Women 
  Social Awareness 
  Intercultural Coexistence 
  Youth 
 
Source: Authors’ findings. 
 Table A.5: Comparison of municipal integration plans for immigrants 
 
 
MADRID 
(2004-2007) 
BARCELONA 
(2005-2007) 
SAN SEBASTIAN 
(2005-2007) 
VITORIA 
(2005-2007) 
ZARAGOZA 
(2006-2009) 
VALENCIA 
(2006-2010) 
Job placement X X X X X X 
Reception X X X X X X 
Civil Service Training X ------ X ------ X ------ 
Legal Services X X X X X ------ 
Mediation Services X X X X X ------ 
Translation-Interpretation Services X X ------ X X ------ 
Coexistence X X X X X ------ 
Monitoring centres/Studies X ------ X X ------ ------ 
Intercultural Communication X ------ X X X ------ 
Mainstream Perspective X X X X X X 
Co-responsibility/ 
Bi-directionality 
X X ------ ------ X X 
Equal Rights X X ------ X X X 
Equal Opportunities X ------ X X X X 
Gender Issues (Women) ------ X X X X X 
Fight against Discrimination X X X X X X 
Acceptance/ Inclusion of diversity X X ------ ------ X X 
Standardization of Access to Public 
Services 
X X X X X X 
Interdepartmental X X X X X X 
Awareness X X X X X X 
Social Participation (Association 
membership) 
X ------ X X X X 
Organizations for Civic Participation X X     
 
